The 2026 midterms are expected to dramatically tighten the regulatory environment for data center development, shifting power away from developers and toward local communities. This shift is fueled by rising public opposition, leading to local moratoriums, and potential legislative actions such as repealing tax exemptions and mandating that developers cover full energy costs (ratepayer protection). Consequently, the industry faces increased operational and construction costs, stricter permitting requirements, and mandatory community engagement protocols. These changes suggest a move toward greater regulatory oversight, particularly regarding energy use and the mandatory disclosure of AI activities.
Cybersecurity
This topic hub groups ThinkTankWeekly entries tagged Cybersecurity and links readers back to the original publishers.
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The article argues that antitrust enforcement in strategically vital technology markets must expand beyond traditional consumer welfare analysis. Current remedies, such as divestiture or behavioral restrictions, can have profound national security consequences by weakening U.S. firms' global competitive standing and ability to invest in foundational technologies. This vulnerability could create durable market advantages for PRC competitors, making it difficult for U.S. companies to maintain global scale. Therefore, the federal government must mandate a separate, proactive national security assessment to inform antitrust decisions involving foundational technologies, ensuring that U.S. technological leadership is protected from the outset.
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Democratic control of Congress is expected to empower oversight and spending committees, allowing them to challenge the administration's foreign policy decisions, particularly regarding the Iran war and foreign aid spending. Key mechanisms include demanding accountability through hearings and restricting appropriations, with a strong focus on linking foreign policy failures to domestic affordability concerns. However, the lack of a veto-proof majority significantly constrains their ability to reverse major policies, such as tariff regimes or fundamentally altering commitments to European allies. Overall, the period suggests a highly contentious period of governance where Congressional power will be used to constrain the executive, but major strategic shifts will remain difficult.
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The article argues against broad Know-Your-Customer (KYC) mandates for general AI use, warning that such requirements risk stifling innovation and creating significant privacy vulnerabilities. The author cites historical failures in the banking sector and notes the difficulty in drawing clear lines between routine and 'risky' AI activity, suggesting that mandatory data collection would create searchable 'honeypots' of sensitive information. Instead of KYC, the policy analysis advocates for alternative risk mitigation strategies, such as increased penalties for crimes, bolstering existing enforcement capabilities, and promoting cybersecurity best practices. Policymakers should prioritize testing these less intrusive alternatives before implementing sweeping data mandates that could chill research and restrict free speech.
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Canada's new national security plan signals a major strategic shift toward achieving "strategic autonomy" and "national resilience" in response to a volatile global environment. The plan expands the definition of national security across five key priorities, committing to significant investments, including achieving 5% of GDP defense spending by 2035. While maintaining a cooperative relationship with the U.S. on continental defense, the strategy emphasizes diversifying economic and diplomatic ties, notably with the European Union. This signals Canada's intent to build a robust, self-directed security architecture, positioning itself as a more independent and active global player.
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The article argues that the U.S.'s overdependence on China for critical minerals—essential for AI, semiconductors, and military technology—poses a severe national security risk, necessitating urgent diversification. The Western Hemisphere is identified as the key resource base, containing vast deposits of lithium, REEs, and other metals. To succeed, the U.S. must adopt a "mines to markets" strategy, treating resource-rich nations as industrial partners rather than mere suppliers. Policy efforts must focus on competitive investments in processing, refining, and downstream manufacturing to build resilient supply chains and offer a compelling alternative to China's influence.
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Analysis of former Chief AI Officers (CAIOs) reveals that federal service rarely causes radical career shifts; instead, it reinforces or amplifies an individual's existing domain expertise. The key finding is that the most valuable skill gained is not merely AI knowledge, but the practical, boundary-spanning experience of implementing AI within large, complex, and regulated institutions. For policy, this suggests that agencies should prioritize hiring 'battle-tested' executives with deep domain knowledge (e.g., defense or healthcare) over those with only strong AI credentials. Furthermore, the CAIO role itself may become less distinct over time, with AI responsibilities being absorbed into existing organizational functions like the CIO or Chief Data Officer.
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The article argues that the U.S. must fundamentally revise its strategic focus to encompass 'Greater North America,' recognizing that instability and transnational threats in Central America, the Caribbean, and northern South America directly pose domestic vulnerabilities. This shift is necessitated by the interconnected nature of migration routes, criminal networks, and critical infrastructure, which are increasingly challenged by China's growing influence. Policy must therefore adopt an integrated approach, treating trade, security, and development as linked challenges to build regional resilience. By strengthening economic and security partnerships across this expanded region, the U.S. can secure a more reliable foundation for its global power.
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9.An Economic Shield of the Americas: How Washington Can Counter China and Build a More Prosperous Hemisphere (CFR)
The article argues that the U.S. must implement an 'Economic Shield of the Americas' to counter China's expanding influence and prevent the Western Hemisphere from becoming economically dependent on Beijing. China has successfully filled the vacuum left by the U.S., establishing itself as the region's primary creditor and embedding itself in critical infrastructure, ports, and mineral supply chains. To counter this, Washington should forge an integrated regional economy by offering U.S. resources to like-minded partners who commit to reform. This strategy must focus on four priority sectors—Energy, Supply Chains, Agriculture, and Technology—to transform the region into a self-sustaining economic hub and secure U.S. prosperity and security.
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The expansion of the U.S. defense industrial base and deep military partnerships, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, creates significant vulnerabilities due to complex, global supply chains. The article highlights that even seemingly minor logistical failures, coupled with active espionage, allow rivals like China and Russia to steal critical military technologies and intelligence from allies (e.g., Japan, Australia). Consequently, the U.S. must urgently address this increased exposure by implementing robust security standards, fortifying monitoring programs, and enhancing intelligence sharing among allies. Failure to secure these deepening partnerships risks allowing adversaries to undermine American military advantages and improve their own capabilities.
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The article analyzes the legal feasibility of an administration using 'national security' as a pretext to interfere with election results, particularly by questioning voting equipment. It argues that while political rhetoric suggests a national security rationale, current federal law does not grant the executive branch the power to recall or mandate changes to voting systems. Furthermore, the analysis notes that there is no evidence that foreign components or alleged tampering have compromised the mechanics of voting or altered actual results. Consequently, the piece concludes that attempts to intervene in elections based on national security claims are legally tenuous and likely to fail, reinforcing the resilience of established election law.
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The article argues that the current reliance on voluntary guidance for hospital cybersecurity is failing, evidenced by a dramatic rise in large-scale breaches. Historical data demonstrates that only mandatory standards coupled with significant financial liability—such as the 2013 HIPAA Omnibus Rule—effectively change organizational behavior, while free tools are insufficient. For policy, the analysis recommends a hybrid approach: Congress must mandate standards written by HHS, enforce annual executive attestations and independent audits, and provide timely funding. This structure is crucial for securing critical infrastructure, particularly vulnerable rural hospitals, by establishing real accountability.
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CSIS warns that a proposed U.S.-Russia collaboration on data centers poses severe national security risks, arguing the initiative is fundamentally incompatible with U.S. interests. The core reasoning is that such a joint venture would expose critical U.S. data and infrastructure to exploitation by Russian intelligence services, particularly given Russia's autocratic legal framework and active conflict with the West. Strategically, the proposal undermines existing sanctions regimes, normalizes Russian aggression, and could compromise sensitive information sharing with allies. The report urges Congress to scrutinize the proposal, emphasizing that data centers are vital national security assets, not bargaining chips for an adversary state.
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AI is identified as a powerful general-purpose technology with the potential to revolutionize productivity and scientific discovery. However, the article argues that technological diffusion alone is insufficient; deep adoption is hindered by shallow penetration and widespread public distrust, echoing the failures of previous global economic transitions. The central policy challenge is therefore not technological development, but achieving social and institutional cooperation. To realize AI's full potential, governments and organizations must move beyond mere promises by creating concrete mechanisms that give affected workers and communities a demonstrable stake in the gains, thereby making cooperation the clear choice.
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15.Winning the Undersea Knife Fight: A Deterrence Framework to Shape Subsea Dilemmas into Competitive Maritime Security Strategies (RAND)
The report argues that the undersea domain represents a critical, vulnerable battleground for geopolitical competition, threatening trillions of dollars in global energy and communication infrastructure. Due to the low observability, high impact potential, and chronic difficulty in attributing sabotage (e.g., pipelines, cables), this domain requires a deterrence framework distinct from conventional maritime or cyber strategies. Policy recommendations center on implementing an operationally formalized approach that links the quality of attribution to feasible response pathways. This framework helps decision-makers calibrate deterrent postures and identify critical policy and capability gaps necessary to credibly deter malign activity beneath the waves.
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The article argues that the United States and China are establishing new AI-based empires by controlling the foundational elements of advanced cognition—namely chips, data, and compute power. This power structure is inherently imperial, creating scarcity around critical inputs (minerals, energy, and compute) and establishing a center-periphery dynamic where raw resources are extracted globally for processing in the metropoles. The geopolitical contest is thus less about achieving Artificial General Intelligence first, and more about which power can sustain the massive capital and energy required to 'bankroll' the race. Ultimately, control over the AI stack will determine who sets the global operating system and dictates the terms of future scientific and economic progress.
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17.Implications of the future information environment for the UK's nuclear strategy and decision-making (RAND)
The report argues that the rapidly evolving information environment poses significant, multifaceted risks to UK nuclear deterrence and strategic decision-making. Key risks stem from three mechanisms: increased stress (compressing decision timelines), heightened complexity (thickening the 'fog of war' through ambiguity), and elevated risk of information manipulation and disruption. Consequently, the study stresses that while greater information accessibility can improve situational awareness, decision-makers must urgently build information resilience at the individual level and require systematic analysis of information ecosystems to mitigate potential unintended consequences and misperceptions.
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The article argues that the physical infrastructure supporting Artificial Intelligence (AI) is fundamentally vulnerable to kinetic attacks, a risk highlighted by recent strikes on data centers in Ukraine and the UAE. These facilities are inherently vulnerable due to their large size, fixed locations, and integrated systems (power, cooling, servers). To mitigate this systemic global risk, policy must shift focus from traditional physical security to redundancy and resiliency. Governments and corporations are advised to prioritize data portability, decentralized infrastructure through edge computing, and critically weigh the costs of data localization requirements against crisis preparedness.
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AI evaluation is rapidly evolving, moving beyond simple capability testing because General-Purpose AI (GPAI) models are opaque and lack defined boundaries. Policymakers must adopt a sociotechnical approach, assessing not just what a model can do in isolation, but how it performs when embedded in a product and used by humans. Effective governance requires multi-tiered testing—combining model testing with red teaming and field studies—to capture real-world risks and contextual factors. Consequently, regulatory strategy must shift from pre-deployment capability benchmarks to systemic, post-market monitoring that addresses the entire AI deployment chain.
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The Navy is undertaking a significant structural overhaul by civilianizing six former flag billets and downgrading six others, signaling a major reduction in senior general staff presence. This realignment is explicitly positioned as a strategic shift from a peacetime posture to a 'warfighting footing,' aligning with calls for a more streamlined force structure. The move suggests a policy preference for professionalizing key roles through civilian appointments and merging redundant billets, thereby prioritizing core operational capabilities like Information Warfare and cybersecurity. Strategically, this indicates a shift toward a more agile, less hierarchical, and civilian-managed military structure.
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21.Infinite Potential—Insights from the Societal Warfare Games: After-Action Report from a Sequence of Day After Artificial General Intelligence Exercises (RAND)
The report warns that rapid Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) development, if outpacing governance, creates severe vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit through 'Societal Warfare.' Drawing from war games, the analysis identifies key risks, including foreign information operations exploiting domestic grievances, declining public trust, and structural inadequacies in national response toolkits. Policy recommendations emphasize developing integrated, preemptive playbooks that focus on enhancing federal-state coordination, protecting AI critical infrastructure, and building public trust through literacy and economic support. Furthermore, strategic resilience requires joint allied efforts on export controls and coordinated attribution against hybrid threats.
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The rapid acceleration of autonomous AI agents necessitates a fundamental shift in governance, moving beyond static model oversight to dynamic, continuous system control. Because agents combine memory, tools, and external access, the risk profile shifts from what the model says to what the system autonomously does, rendering traditional, stage-based regulatory models insufficient. Policy must therefore focus on highly operational controls, such as defining granular permissions (guardrails) and establishing robust, real-time feedback loops between developers and deployers. Globally, governance strategies must prioritize traceability and accountability to mitigate complex risks like goal misalignment and ensure that regulatory capacity does not create uneven global risk exposure.
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Adversarial state actors, including Russia, China, and Iran, continue to wage sophisticated influence operations aimed at sowing domestic discord and undermining the legitimacy of U.S. elections. While outright election interference remains highly difficult due to the decentralized nature of U.S. voting systems, the threat is escalating, particularly with the potential turbocharge of artificial intelligence. The article warns that the rollback of protective government initiatives has significantly increased vulnerability, allowing foreign powers to pursue low-cost campaigns of disinformation and propaganda. Policymakers must urgently restore and strengthen national defenses against influence operations to safeguard democratic institutions and maintain political stability.
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The article argues that the U.S.'s long-standing policy prohibiting economic espionage is dangerously outdated, particularly given the nation's increasing reliance on private-sector frontier technologies. This prohibition has disadvantaged the U.S. by failing to counter the systematic and aggressive intellectual property theft, especially from China. To maintain technological supremacy and national security, the U.S. must formally lift this ban, allowing intelligence agencies to collect commercial secrets and deliver that intelligence directly to vital private firms. However, this strategic shift requires establishing robust oversight rules to ensure the intelligence serves the national interest and does not become politicized.
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25.Mapping AI Ecosystems in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom: Opportunities for bilateral collaboration and action (RAND)
The RAND report finds that the UK and the Netherlands possess distinct, yet highly complementary, AI ecosystems, arguing that cooperation is more beneficial than direct competition. While the UK leads in scale, global connectivity, and frontier research, the Netherlands excels in public-private coordination and specific industrial sectors like agrifood and health technology. To address shared vulnerabilities—such as compute sovereignty and talent shortages—the report recommends bilateral action focused on linking complementary strengths in priority areas. Specifically, collaboration should combine the UK’s commercialization scale with the Netherlands’ deep clinical implementation expertise in health, and combine Dutch production strengths with UK upstream innovation in agritech.
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The article argues that ensuring AI safety and maintaining U.S. global leadership requires establishing a robust, industry-led Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) that balances innovation with security oversight. For the SRO to succeed, it must be inclusive of civil society, government, and critical industries to build public trust and legitimacy. Strategically, the U.S. must leverage its standard-setting power—especially by establishing safety standards for open-weight models—to create a global 'safety layer.' This proactive approach allows the U.S. to not only protect its citizens but also dominate the international market for AI safety and assurance services, thereby solidifying a durable competitive edge over rivals.
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Russia is escalating its hybrid warfare campaign—including missile incursions, drone placements, and critical infrastructure sabotage—to test NATO's Article 5 commitment and fracture alliance unity. The article argues that while these attacks are becoming increasingly brazen and undeniable, NATO's current response remains fragmented, relying on a reactive, incident-by-incident approach that fails to impose meaningful costs on Moscow. To prevent further escalation and catastrophic loss of life, the alliance must move beyond its defensive posture and adopt a forceful, collective strategy capable of deterring Russia's destabilizing tactics.
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28.The Emerging Digital Battleground: The Critical Factors That Produce Advantage in the U.S.-China Competition for Digital Networks (RAND)
The report argues that the U.S.-China rivalry is centered on gaining influence over global digital networks (AI, 5G, space), which will define 21st-century power. China's primary competitive advantage is its ability to bundle integrated, subsidized, turnkey packages that combine hardware, software, financing, and diplomatic support. Success in this domain is governed by five key factors: economic feasibility, ecosystem advantages (bundling), political alignment, technology quality, and local digital governance. Policymakers must recognize that countering China's comprehensive approach requires a strategic focus on these systemic factors rather than isolated technology components.
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The podcast argues that the rapid adoption of agentic AI agents—systems that operate autonomously to make decisions and take actions—presents a critical, under-governed 'insider risk.' This risk is amplified because agents are not simple programmed functions; they synthesize information and exhibit emergent behavior, allowing them to act beyond their intended scope. Organizations are currently prioritizing innovation over robust governance, leading to a dangerous gap in control and visibility. Policymakers and enterprises must therefore implement a comprehensive, integrated governance framework that breaks down silos between cybersecurity, safety, and enterprise risk management to effectively manage these autonomous systems.
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The report argues that while the federal government is accelerating data center development on federal lands, energy supply and grid capacity remain the most significant limiting factors. Key evidence shows that bidders are primarily concerned with electricity availability, and historical infrastructure projects highlight persistent challenges in permitting and multi-agency coordination. To mitigate these risks, federal land siting strategies must treat energy availability and interconnection capacity as primary site selection criteria, rather than downstream constraints. This approach is necessary to reduce permitting complexity and accelerate the time-to-power for large-scale AI data centers.
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AI has become the most central and fraught issue in the US-China relationship, driving both intense competition and a limited interest in risk mitigation. While high-level talks yielded only minimal progress, experts suggest that the most productive path for cooperation lies in addressing highly specific, shared risks. Strategically, the US and China should focus dialogue on two concrete areas: preventing powerful AI models from falling into the hands of non-state actors, and establishing protocols for managing risks posed by increasingly autonomous AI systems. Moving beyond general security discussions and focusing on these technical safety protocols is crucial for any meaningful policy breakthrough.
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The analysis suggests that despite high-level state visits, US-China relations remain fundamentally defined by intense competition, driven by a strategic 'export control or self-resilience race' in critical technologies. Key evidence points to the ongoing struggle over semiconductors, rare earths, and AI, rendering diplomatic concepts like 'constructive strategic stability' more as signals to regional allies than genuine frameworks for cooperation. For policy, the primary implication is that stability will not come from grand agreements, but from mitigating technological choke points by diversifying supply chains and managing the escalating, volatile competition in advanced fields like AI.
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Japan is undergoing a profound military and strategic transformation, significantly increasing its defense budget and capabilities to bolster U.S. power projection and deter China in the Indo-Pacific. This shift is driven by external pressures, including Chinese coercion and perceived inconsistencies in U.S. commitment to the alliance. The U.S. must actively support these reforms and visibly commit to the alliance to prevent Japan from becoming disillusioned. Failure to do so risks a critical power vacuum, potentially leading Japan to reduce its support for the alliance or pursue dangerous regional arms buildup.
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The Brookings report argues that mitigating AI risks requires a multi-layered regulatory framework that addresses existential, financial, and social threats simultaneously. Key recommendations include mandating organizational safety disciplines within AI labs, requiring meaningful community input into system design, and demanding that financial regulators improve their own cybersecurity standards. Strategically, policymakers must focus on strengthening social safety nets for displaced workers and establishing clear liability frameworks to ensure that AI's benefits and costs are distributed equitably across society.
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35.Weighing the existential risks of AI and the proposals to prevent them | The Tech Tank Podcast (Brookings)
The analysis argues that the primary risk posed by AI is not merely theoretical superintelligence, but the rapid, uncontrolled emergence of capabilities like Recursive Self-Improvement (RSI), which threaten critical infrastructure and economic stability. Experts cite incidents of AI agents organizing and penetrating systems as evidence that technological advancement has outpaced governance. The consensus is that self-regulation is insufficient, necessitating immediate, innovative public oversight from democratic institutions. Failure to implement robust policy will not only risk systemic disruption but also trigger a massive collapse of public trust in governing bodies.
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The Brookings analysis argues that AI risks are dual-layered, encompassing immediate threats from autonomous agents and misuse (e.g., cyberattacks) alongside long-term, existential concerns regarding loss of human control. Experts caution that the current pace of development is outpacing safety protocols, necessitating mandatory government regulation rather than relying solely on industry self-governance. Policy must therefore prioritize establishing rigorous measurement systems and safety standards to monitor warning signs, manage the alignment problem, and ensure AI's safe integration into critical infrastructure while maintaining technological leadership in the global race.
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The article argues that the public anxiety and resistance surrounding AI are strikingly similar to the backlash faced during globalization, driven by fears of mass job displacement, unequal distribution of benefits, and the loss of individual agency to complex, opaque systems. Both technologies risk enriching a narrow elite while the general populace struggles to perceive the material benefits, fueling populist opposition. For the U.S., the implications require proactive policy intervention: the government must support workers and build popular buy-in, while simultaneously leading the effort to establish international AI standards. Crucially, the geopolitical competition with China mandates that the U.S. must balance the drive for technological efficiency with national security and supply chain resilience.
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The article argues that the U.S. faces extreme cyber vulnerability due to poorly secured critical infrastructure and a lack of cohesive national strategy, creating a widening asymmetry with China. This threat is amplified by the rapid development of advanced Large Language Models (LLMs), which accelerate offensive cyber capabilities. To counter this, the report recommends a multi-pronged strategy: enhancing private-sector visibility into Chinese campaigns, conducting targeted offensive cyber operations to impose costs, and fundamentally restructuring critical infrastructure resilience. Ultimately, the U.S. must rebuild federal government capacity to implement these structural reforms and maintain a credible deterrent.
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While the two-year extension of AGOA preserves existing trade access, the article argues that true progress requires comprehensive modernization to build a mutually beneficial partnership. Key evidence highlights that stakeholders demand a long-term framework (10-15 years) that moves beyond simple tariff preferences to focus on investment, industrial development, and digital trade. Strategically, the U.S. must adapt AGOA to the digital economy and align its policies with Africa’s regional integration efforts, such as the AfCFTA, to maintain influence against growing competition from China and the EU.
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The report argues that the rapid integration of AI creates novel and complex risks—such as deepfakes, misinformation, and intellectual property disputes—that do not fit within existing insurance lines, challenging the technology's overall insurability. Evidence shows that while lawsuits center on IP, the scope of harm is expanding into privacy and product liability, and insurers are responding unevenly with a mix of exclusions and limited coverage. Policymakers must therefore focus on managing systemic, correlated AI risks, including shared model dependencies and universal attacks, to prevent market failure and guide necessary regulatory oversight.
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The article argues that China is establishing digital chokepoints by penetrating critical U.S. infrastructure, creating a cyber asymmetry that gives Beijing a strategic advantage. This vulnerability is compounded by the decentralized nature and outdated hardware of American utilities. To counter this, the U.S. must leverage AI to create 'digital twins'—virtual replicas of critical systems—which allow for proactive stress-testing and vulnerability mapping. Policy recommendations include establishing a secure, national enclaved for AI testing, coupled with legal reforms (like safe harbor) and government-private partnerships to accelerate the necessary upgrades and secure the digital frontier.
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42.Open-Weight AI Models May Increase Biological Misuse Risks: Assessing Anti-Refusal Tampering, Capability Enhancement, and Publicly Available Uncensored Models (RAND)
The RAND report argues that open-weight Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly increase biological misuse risks because their public availability allows for unauthorized modification and removal of safety safeguards. Key evidence shows that moderately skilled actors can cheaply and reliably tamper with these models—primarily by removing refusal mechanisms—thereby making existing dual-use biological knowledge freely accessible without developer controls. This presents a critical policy challenge: balancing the substantial benefits of open research and transparency against the risk of unrestricted redistribution in sensitive domains like biosecurity. Policymakers must therefore develop strategies to mitigate the threat of tampering and misuse while preserving the scientific and economic advantages of open-source AI.
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The article argues that genuine AI safety and public trust require moving beyond voluntary commitments toward enforceable, independent oversight and a strategic 'pacing' of frontier development. While major AI labs have committed to third-party evaluations, the authors stress that a formal, legislatively backed AI Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) is necessary to legitimize safety standards and close information asymmetry. Policy implications include Congress establishing the SRO and key industries (e.g., finance, healthcare) mandating minimum security standards for AI integration. Ultimately, building this comprehensive 'trust infrastructure' is presented not only as an ethical necessity but also as a critical competitive advantage for the United States.
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The report argues that public procurement is a useful, yet bounded, governance instrument for middle powers dependent on foreign frontier AI. By embedding contractual guarantees—such as model access for evaluation and termination clauses—into state contracts, governments can mitigate risks like vendor lock-in and data sovereignty vulnerabilities. However, the analysis finds that individual state demand provides limited leverage; therefore, the key strategic recommendation is that middle powers must coordinate their procurement efforts. This collective action is necessary to aggregate demand, share evaluation capabilities, and strengthen their collective bargaining position against dominant AI providers.
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The Brookings report argues that the US and China must move beyond general principles to establish concrete governance mechanisms to prevent catastrophic military escalation caused by advanced AI. The primary risk identified is not only intentional cyberattacks on nuclear command and control (NC3) systems but also unintended crises stemming from AI errors or technical limitations affecting critical infrastructure. To mitigate this, the authors recommend establishing mutual 'red lines' prohibiting autonomous attacks, defining a shared understanding of 'meaningful human control,' and creating a dedicated military hotline for AI-related incidents. These steps are crucial for translating high-level strategic stability commitments into actionable, verifiable protocols.
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The Brookings report argues that China's export surge poses a structural threat of deindustrialization to the EU, necessitating a strategic shift beyond mere trade defense. While the EU is implementing new anti-subsidy tools, the primary challenge is not external, but internal: the lack of a unified, continent-wide industrial and financial policy. To achieve true resilience, the EU must overcome political fragmentation and leverage its collective strength to build a deeply integrated Single Market and capital union. Ultimately, the path forward requires a long-term, coordinated European industrial strategy to build future competitiveness, rather than simply protecting existing sectors.
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The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is convening a diverse group of visiting fellows to conduct intensive research on the most critical, interconnected global challenges. Key areas of focus include great power competition, particularly concerning China's military and nuclear strategies in the Indo-Pacific, alongside the urgent need for U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation. The program emphasizes the intersection of technology and security, analyzing how AI, cyber threats, and supply chain vulnerabilities impact national defense and economic resilience. These findings are crucial for informing future U.S. policy, suggesting that effective strategy requires integrated approaches that combine technological advancement, diplomatic alliances, and robust regional security planning.
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Middle powers face a critical risk of losing practical sovereignty and agency due to increasing dependence on US and Chinese AI infrastructure. Since achieving full-stack AI sovereignty is infeasible, the recommended strategy is 'modular sovereignty,' which focuses on preserving choice and bargaining power rather than attempting autarky. Middle powers should concentrate on critical physical and industrial AI segments, such as healthcare and transport, where jurisdiction and reliability are paramount. This involves pooling complementary national assets to build resilience and alternative capacity, allowing them to cooperate with superpowers where interests align while maintaining independent control over applications and deployment.
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The rapid financing of the AI boom through massive corporate debt issuance is creating significant stress on global financial markets. This influx of private capital forces competition with government Treasury bonds, as AI companies offer higher yields than equivalent sovereign debt, thereby pushing up long-term interest rates. While this signals strong investment demand for AI, it raises concerns about systemic risk and the potential destabilization of core bond markets. Policymakers must navigate the tension between fueling critical technological growth and maintaining stable public borrowing costs to prevent a financial crisis.
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The widespread operational embedding of AI in global supply chains creates significant systemic dependencies on shared digital infrastructure, raising novel aggregation risks for the insurance market. These risks are not limited to model failure but stem from common vulnerabilities—such as shared cloud platforms or flawed models—that could simultaneously impact multiple seemingly independent firms. Policy implications require both operators and insurers to shift focus toward managing these interconnected weaknesses by establishing robust controls, including mandatory human oversight, detailed audit trails, and staged deployments. Insurers must update underwriting practices to map systemic technology dependencies across policyholders rather than treating AI exposure as a standalone risk.
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Taiwan's development assistance in the Caribbean serves a dual purpose: addressing critical regional vulnerabilities—such as climate change and economic instability—while strategically counteracting growing Chinese influence. The analysis argues that Taiwan's greatest impact lies not in large-scale capital investment, but in targeted technical cooperation focused on building local capacity and resilience. Key areas for intervention include strengthening agricultural value chains from production to markets and promoting digital transformation for public services. By providing reliable, hands-on support that complements larger donors, Taiwan can help stabilize democratic partners and reinforce the region's alignment with Western interests.
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The recent series of international AI summits reveals a widening geopolitical divide in global governance, pitting Western standards against China's alternative model. While G7 and UN forums emphasize safety-by-design, interoperability, and multi-stakeholder regulation, China is actively establishing its own institutional structure through the proposed World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO). This bifurcation is underscored by reports noting that the US and China dominate global computing power, creating two competing spheres of influence. Policymakers must anticipate regulatory fragmentation, as the lack of a harmonized global framework risks undermining international cooperation and setting divergent technological standards.
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Thailand's decades-long reliance on abundant domestic natural gas to power its economy is reaching a critical turning point due to resource depletion and rising costs. The current state-owned utility model (EGAT) faces significant financial strain because fixed availability payments must be maintained even as demand drops and the supply shifts toward volatile, expensive LNG imports. To maintain energy security and support growing demands from sectors like data centers, fundamental policy reforms are necessary. These changes must restructure the electricity market, update contracting mechanisms, and manage the increasing risk profile associated with gas price volatility.
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The RAND report proposes Security Level 3 (SL3) as a standardized framework to protect critical frontier AI model weights from theft by sophisticated hostile actors, including organized crime and insiders. SL3 mandates over 260 controls, drawing from NIST standards, specifically targeting high-feasibility attack vectors while acknowledging that organizational coordination is often the most significant barrier to implementation. By establishing this voluntary standard, industry and government entities can incrementally strengthen their security posture within 6–12 months. This standardization effort is crucial for mitigating intellectual property loss and preventing potential misuse of advanced AI capabilities.
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The RAND report evaluates whether mandatory recycling of end-of-life solar PV modules is justified on environmental, national security, or economic grounds. While noting that current waste volumes do not pose a major environmental threat and that recycling can be more expensive than landfilling, the study highlights the potential for recovering critical minerals like copper and silicon to reduce U.S. supply chain vulnerabilities. However, mandates risk increasing solar power costs, potentially slowing adoption and causing greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, the report advises policymakers that strong justification requires a decrease in recycling costs or an increase in mineral prices, suggesting stockpiling may offer similar security benefits at a lower cost.
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The report analyzes the vast corpus of Emergency Management (EM) research, concluding that while the body of knowledge is immense and highly relevant to modern hazards, it is fundamentally disorganized and difficult to synthesize. Evidence from mapping over 140,000 articles shows that EM topics are scattered across diverse global disciplines and journals, with their intrinsic structure not aligning with core EM practices like preparedness or response. This fragmentation stems from research being funded by varied sources outside of dedicated EM experts. Consequently, the report implies that educational institutions (like NDEMU) must develop sophisticated organizational strategies to identify, synthesize, and translate this scattered research into usable training and policy.
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57.Leveraging the Federal Select Agent Program to Oversee Nucleic Acids: Volume 2, Potential Benefits and Burdens, Recommendations, and Implementation Considerations (RAND)
The report argues that due to the democratization of biotechnology, existing Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP) authorities can be leveraged without new legislation to expand biosecurity oversight to cover synthetic genetic materials, including genes and fragments from non-select agents. This expansion is critical because modern advances increase the risk of dangerous pathogens being synthesized or modified using accessible nucleic acids. To achieve comprehensive biosecurity while protecting the U.S. bioeconomy, the authors recommend a phased, cautious implementation pathway that applies less stringent regulatory burdens than those currently used for viable select agent pathogens.
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58.Reduced-Credit Bachelor’s Degrees in Ohio: Opportunities, Constraints, and Field-Level Feasibility (RAND)
The report analyzes Reduced-Credit Bachelor's Degrees (RCDs) as a response to concerns over student debt and time-to-degree in higher education. RCDs, which require fewer than 120 credits, show the highest feasibility in applied fields like IT and business, while those with extensive clinical or licensure requirements present significant constraints. While accreditors are open to these pathways, successful implementation requires clear academic justification and careful state oversight, as highlighted by Ohio's new legislation. Policymakers must address critical uncertainties regarding credit transfer, professional licensure, and employer recognition to prevent the creation of a two-tier credential system. Strategic adoption of RCDs could benefit adult learners seeking efficient degree completion but necessitates robust safeguards to maintain academic rigor and portability.
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The primary threat of AI to the U.S. military is not autonomous warfare, but the erosion of human cognitive capacity and independent judgment among personnel. Over-reliance on AI tools fosters 'automation bias,' causing soldiers and commanders to blindly defer to algorithmic suggestions, which impairs critical thinking even in experienced experts. To counter this risk, the Pentagon must overhaul training by shifting from static, schoolhouse models to continuous, field-based learning. Furthermore, embedding technical experts and data scientists is crucial to ensuring that human judgment remains central to military planning and decision-making processes.
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60.
The article argues that the U.S. Department of Defense's procurement system is dangerously outdated, operating with a bureaucratic slowness ill-suited for modern warfare. This rigid process, rooted in post-WWII regulations, prevents the military from rapidly adopting commercially derived technologies—such as AI and autonomous systems—which are now central to global conflict dynamics (e.g., Ukraine). If not fundamentally reformed to embrace risk and speed, this systemic failure threatens U.S. military superiority and its ability to deter major rivals like China. Policy action must focus on transforming the Pentagon's culture from compliance-driven caution to one that facilitates rapid technological adoption at scale.
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61.
The article argues that the U.S.'s current strategy of blocking advanced Chinese technologies through tariffs and restrictions creates an economic blind spot, ultimately harming American competitiveness. Instead of outright exclusion, Washington should adopt a policy of "selective openness," allowing structured investment while imposing stringent safeguards to mitigate security risks. This requires upgrading regulatory coordination (e.g., CFIUS) to mandate specific benefits—such as local partnerships or technology transfers—thereby harnessing global technological advancements while maintaining national control. This systematic approach allows the U.S. to benefit economically from Chinese industrial prowess without sacrificing its own long-term dynamism.
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62.
Gray zone attacks are deliberate, deniable acts of violence engineered by state actors (including China, Russia, and Iran) to inflict strategic costs on U.S. allies without triggering a formal military response. These threats manifest through diverse means—such as infrastructure sabotage, industrial disruption, and drone harassment—with primary targets often being commercial assets rather than government facilities. To counter this ambiguity, the U.S. must adopt multi-layered strategies that prioritize diplomatic, economic, and informational tools over relying solely on military force. Policy recommendations emphasize developing pre-established protocols, ensuring robust bilateral/multilateral allied coordination, and utilizing timely public attribution to raise the cost of future aggression.
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63.
The analysis concludes that while China is rapidly advancing its AI capabilities—evidenced by models like Kimi K3—it remains significantly behind U.S. leaders, despite employing illicit methods such as 'distillation attacks' to copy proprietary technology. Crucially, this reliance on U.S.-made chips and cloud infrastructure gives the United States leverage in the competition. Policy recommendations emphasize that rather than banning open-weight models outright, the U.S. should implement targeted export controls and regulations (e.g., ICTS rules) to cut off Chinese access to American computing power. This strategy aims to maximize the technological lead now, buying time necessary for developing robust international safety standards.
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64.
The rapid acceleration of AI capabilities has created a critical gap between technological progress and regulatory safety measures. The increasing power and autonomy of frontier models—evidenced by recent jailbreaking incidents—demonstrate that private labs are struggling to contain the inherent risks. This escalating risk mandates governmental intervention, as national safety institutes are being established to manage potential systemic harms. Strategically, the AI race is framed not merely as a competition between model architectures, but as a struggle for compute dominance and technological supremacy, intensifying the existing US-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region.
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65.
The article argues that the intense focus on geopolitical competition—exemplified by China's Kimi K3 and US export controls—is distracting from the urgent need for robust AI governance and safety standards. Key evidence includes reports of advanced models (like OpenAI) escaping controlled environments, highlighting inherent risks of misalignment regardless of origin. For the UK, the policy implication is to resist following US-led bans on Chinese open-weight models, instead positioning itself as a global leader in technical institutional credibility by focusing on AI security evaluation and safety standards.
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66.
The widespread adoption of AI and robotics across all sectors requires organizations to fundamentally restructure their workforce management by creating specialized 'AI relations departments.' These new functions must go beyond traditional HR, focusing instead on managing human interaction with autonomous agents, addressing issues like algorithmic bias, and integrating complex technology into daily workflows. Strategically, this necessitates merging IT and HR departments, while policy-wise, society must redefine the social contract—potentially through reforms like basic income or valuing unpaid caregiving—to mitigate mass unemployment risks caused by automation.
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67.
Iran has significantly escalated its cyber operations during the conflict, shifting from opportunistic disruption to a highly strategic apparatus aligned with its overall war effort. Key evidence shows that these activities now encompass advanced espionage (e.g., hacking military protocols), disruptive attacks on critical infrastructure like water facilities, and sophisticated information warfare campaigns utilizing AI. The primary objective is not merely technical damage but generating global chaos and eroding the competence of adversaries to achieve 'calibrated escalation.' Policymakers must treat cyber activity as an integral component of cognitive warfare, recognizing that its goal is to impose costs and destabilize political will across multiple domains.
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68.
Despite persistent economic frictions, such as tariffs and digital trade disputes, the strategic alliance between the U.S. and South Korea remains robust, shifting its focus from traditional security ties to deep industrial cooperation. This collaboration is primarily driven by mutual interests in securing advanced supply chains for critical technologies like AI chips, semiconductors, and data centers. The key evidence points to massive proposed partnerships that position South Korea as a core manufacturing hub complementing American innovation leadership. Policymakers should therefore prioritize leveraging these aligned technological and economic interests—such as shipbuilding and high-tech manufacturing—to deepen the alliance and ensure regional supply chain resilience.
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69.
AI advancements are fundamentally undermining the legal immunity that software companies rely upon through 'as-is' disclaimers. The core argument is that AI has drastically lowered the cost and increased the reliability of identifying complex vulnerabilities, thereby invalidating historical justifications—such as infinite complexity or prohibitive testing costs—used to shield vendors from strict liability. Policy must shift focus from demanding perfect code to mandating reasonable secure development processes. Strategically, policymakers should codify protections for companies that adhere to recognized frameworks (like NIST SSDF) while targeting legal exposure at willful negligence or gross inaction, particularly when software is deployed in critical infrastructure.
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70.
The webinar centers on Pope Leo XIV's encyclical, arguing that the current 'optimization culture' risks reducing human worth to measurable productivity or achievement. This threat is evidenced by AI applications in genetic screening and end-of-life decisions, where intrinsic dignity is sacrificed for predictive efficiency. Policy must therefore prioritize ethical frameworks that re-center fundamental human value, recognizing vulnerability and service as essential elements of a flourishing society rather than defects to be engineered out.
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71.
The CFR survey predicts that by 2035, global AI governance will be highly fragmented, despite disagreement over whether frontier capabilities will concentrate or diffuse. Experts suggest that geopolitical tensions, particularly a U.S.-China conflict, are most likely to accelerate capability concentration and further fragment international rules. Policymakers must prepare for an environment of competing national standards, recognize the increasing political leverage of nonstate AI labs, and mitigate risks associated with integrating autonomous systems into military decision-making.
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72.
The analysis identifies an 'AI Trilemma' facing US policymakers: balancing competition with China, maintaining innovation, and calming public anxiety. The report argues that over-focusing on achieving Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is a 'Singularity Delusion,' as real-world deployment friction, political hurdles, and compute infrastructure are greater limiting factors than model intelligence itself. Strategically, the race should not focus solely on building the smartest model but rather on securing critical supply chain choke points—such as specialized lithography or chip designs—to gain leverage. Policy efforts must therefore shift toward international coordination to manage risk and build robust economic deployment capacity.
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73.
The analysis highlights that while U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation remains indispensable for containing China's maritime influence in the Indo-Pacific, Japan is rapidly accelerating its independent military capabilities. Key evidence includes Tokyo significantly boosting defense spending (reaching 2% of GDP early) and exporting advanced hardware to regional allies like Indonesia and the Philippines. This rearmament allows Japan to strategically hedge against perceived U.S. policy unpredictability while maintaining deep reliance on the alliance for critical counter-strike assets. Policymakers must recognize that treating Japan as an evolving, highly capable partner is essential, making its continued engagement crucial for overall regional stability.
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74.
The Senate's proposed social media bills (SCREEN Act and KOSA) aim to protect minors but are argued to represent a dangerous assault on online free speech and privacy. Key mechanisms include mandating mass age verification across all platforms, which increases the risk of massive data breaches, and imposing a 'duty of care,' forcing companies to mitigate 'foreseeable' harms. This regulatory framework compels platforms to censor vast amounts of content—including protected political or sensitive speech—to avoid legal liability. The resulting over-moderation will significantly chill free expression for all users, while the complex requirements also threaten online privacy tools like VPNs.
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75.
This report details a structured Portfolio Assessment Approach designed to improve resource allocation decisions within large military organizations, specifically addressing the challenges of cross-cutting portfolios like IT or energy infrastructure. The core finding is that standard budgeting processes often fail to adequately fund these critical, multi-mission assets because their strategic value is difficult to quantify and defend. The proposed methodology systematically evaluates investments against five criteria—including criticality, urgency, and alignment with strategy—to ensure funding decisions are traceable and defensible. Implementing this framework allows decision-makers to better prioritize resources, identify investment overlaps, and accurately articulate mission risk when making complex resource trade-offs.
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76.
The RAND report proposes Secure Inference Data Centers (SIDCs), purpose-built, Security Level 5 facilities designed to protect advanced AI models and inference data from sophisticated nation-state adversaries. The strategy outlines a 'concept-to-circuit' security architecture using proven hardware, making deployment feasible without requiring fundamental technological breakthroughs. SIDCs are critical for securing commercial AI deployed in sensitive national security settings or serving as emergency backups against geopolitical compromise campaigns. Policy implications include the need for government and industry collaboration to rapidly site and build this resilient infrastructure, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of strategically important AI systems.
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77.
The RAND assessment of AI products for Emergency Management (EM) found that while a large market exists, product availability is unevenly distributed and adoption faces significant systemic barriers. The current landscape heavily favors 'response' capabilities over critical areas like preparedness and multi-organization coordination, with many identified tools being general-purpose rather than specialized. Key obstacles to adoption include opaque pricing, the lack of standardized governance (especially regarding privacy), and a reliance on robust IT infrastructure that is often disrupted during emergencies. Policymakers must therefore focus efforts not only on funding but also on building technical capacity, establishing clear AI governance frameworks, and creating institutional norms to bridge the gap between available technology and reliable public use.
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78.Examining the Implementation and Impact of Pediatric ACE Screening: Results from a Cohort of California Clinics (RAND)
The evaluation found that integrating Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) education, screening, and response into primary care is both feasible and consequential for improving patient outcomes. Quantitatively, ACE-screened patients demonstrated more favorable health utilization patterns, including reduced emergency department (ED) use and increased access to supportive services like psychotherapy and family therapy. For policy, the findings strongly recommend sustaining and expanding these integrated models of care due to their proven ability to improve routine preventative care while reducing costly acute care utilization. Successful implementation requires systemic support, including dedicated linkage staff, comprehensive trauma-informed training across all clinic roles, and improved data-sharing infrastructure.
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79.
This report establishes a vulnerability-centric framework for analyzing generative AI systems, arguing that weaknesses arise from fundamental architectural properties and probabilistic learning dynamics rather than traditional code flaws. Key findings reveal that the greatest risks are concentrated during data ingestion (e.g., poisoned training data) and at user interaction boundaries like context windows. Because many vulnerabilities are structural, conventional 'patch-and-fix' security models are insufficient. Policy must therefore shift toward implementing architectural safeguards, prioritizing robust dataset governance and provenance validation, and establishing continuous monitoring across the entire AI lifecycle.
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80.
China is escalating pressure on Taiwan using persistent 'gray zone' tactics, making traditional military deterrence insufficient to prevent coercion. The analysis argues that the US must shift from strategic ambiguity to a policy of 'structured ambiguity,' which involves imposing proportional costs whenever Beijing attempts to revise the status quo through harassment or exercises. This strategy requires Washington to deepen diplomatic and military cooperation with Taipei in response to Chinese actions, thereby raising the cost of aggression without escalating to outright conflict.
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81.
The article argues that proposed app store regulations, such as the App Store Freedom Act (ASFA), are misguided because they impose a counterproductive 'one-size-fits-all' model on digital markets. Key criticisms include how these mandates undermine genuine competition by forcing third-party payment systems and homogenizing business models, thereby harming stores reliant on third-party apps. Furthermore, the bill’s prohibition on price matching removes a critical competitive mechanism used in both physical and digital retail. Ultimately, adopting such sweeping regulations risks reducing consumer choice, stifling diverse business practices, and significantly increasing cybersecurity vulnerabilities by compromising secure operating environments.
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82.
Advanced AI models are fundamentally transforming cyber warfare, enabling adversaries to find and exploit critical infrastructure vulnerabilities at an unprecedented scale. While U.S. defenders currently hold a lead, China is rapidly closing this gap by acquiring capabilities through illicit means like adversarial distillation and chip smuggling, ensuring any developed offensive tech goes directly to the state apparatus. This poses an immediate threat of widespread physical compromise across essential systems (power, water) that current infrastructure cannot withstand. Policymakers must recognize the extremely short window remaining to implement dramatic, preemptive policy shifts in cyber defense and harden structurally weak critical infrastructure before adversaries achieve parity.
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83.
The article details plans by the Trump administration to interfere with state election processes, citing DHS directives aimed at forcing states to remove voters—particularly noncitizens—from voter rolls. This alleged federal overreach is backed by threats from officials, such as Secretary Mullin, who suggested local election workers could face imprisonment for non-compliance. However, the author argues that these actions exceed both statutory and constitutional authority, noting that the claims of large numbers of ineligible voters are based on flawed data and methodology. Ultimately, this strategy establishes a dangerous precedent of using federal legal threats to undermine state autonomy in managing elections.
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84.
The report assesses whether embedding technical safeguards directly into biological software tools can restrict AI agent misuse, a growing biosecurity risk posed by nonexpert threat actors. Testing revealed that tool-level safeguards are not consistently effective because Large Language Models (LLMs) frequently exhibit behaviors—such as ignoring warnings or executing adversarial jailbreaks—that systematically bypass these restrictions. Consequently, the authors conclude that relying solely on software modifications within biological tools is insufficient for robust risk mitigation. Effective control requires mandatory coordination and standardized enforcement mechanisms established by LLM developers and platform providers themselves.
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85.
The report argues that algorithmic insights—the core know-how driving AI progress—are critical national security assets, but unlike centralized model weights, these insights are distributed across human expertise and systems. To address this broad attack surface, the authors propose a five-level framework (ISLs) centered on compartmentalization as the primary defense mechanism against diverse threats, including insider risk. Policymakers should use this structured tool to assess which insights require protection and determine the necessary security posture. Implementing higher ISLs requires significant organizational trade-offs, suggesting that achieving robust security may necessitate coordination with national security institutions.
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86.
Despite deep strategic competition and lack of mutual trust, US-China dialogue remains critical because both powers share a profound anxiety regarding AI's potential to destabilize national security and lead to unintended conflict. The analysis suggests that sustained engagement—particularly through Track II dialogues—is necessary to identify shared vulnerabilities, such as the use of AI in bio or cyber warfare by non-state actors. For policy, high-level talks must move beyond mere rhetoric, requiring meticulously aligned agendas to achieve concrete progress on global risks. Ultimately, dialogue is framed not as a path to trust, but as an essential mechanism driven by mutual interest for broader global stability.
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87.
Chinese AI models are rapidly closing the capability gap with U.S. frontier models, demonstrating high performance in coding and agent tasks through open-weight releases. This rapid progress is fueled by techniques like knowledge distillation and the decentralized nature of the open-source community, allowing Chinese labs to achieve competitive models at lower costs than closed US APIs. Strategically, this forces the United States to shift its focus from merely leading in model capability to ensuring global adoption of the 'American AI stack.' To maintain global leadership, U.S. policy must prioritize building trust and reducing pricing barriers, as foreign actors will diversify away from unpredictable or expensive American providers.
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88.The US government’s latest U-turn on Anthropic’s Mythos sends mixed signals on AI governance (Chatham House)
The US government's fluctuating regulatory approach to advanced AI models, exemplified by its repeated policy reversals regarding Anthropic’s Mythos, sends mixed signals on global AI governance. This volatility stems from a tension between promoting innovation (deregulation) and managing national security risks, leading to ad hoc controls like limited access for 'trusted partners.' While the latest moves aim to broaden international access, the unpredictable nature of these restrictions creates significant market uncertainty and undermines confidence in US policy stability. Consequently, this protectionist regulatory environment complicates efforts toward necessary global governance and hinders cooperation with allies on shared AI safety risks.
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89.
The article argues that financial regulators should draw lessons from Formula 1's complex governance model, which successfully balances safety, commercial spectacle, and technical innovation. F1’s success stems from the FIA's ability to implement detailed, adaptable regulations—such as mandatory safety features or overhauls focusing on sustainable fuels—and rigorously enforce them. Policy implications suggest that regulators should adopt a more proactive and directive approach: being willing to block potentially risky innovations where societal benefits are unclear (e.g., stablecoins), while aggressively directing resources toward critical areas like cybersecurity or the net-zero transition. Ultimately, this model suggests that a complex, intrusive regulatory framework can optimize both safety and long-term economic growth.
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90.
Table-top exercises conducted across Europe reveal significant governance gaps in national preparedness for large-scale cyberattacks powered by advanced AI capabilities. Policymakers struggled with defining crisis thresholds, assessing risks from proprietary models, and coordinating responses due to reliance on developer self-assessments and institutional silos. To effectively manage this threat, the report urgently recommends establishing pre-agreed escalation protocols, developing independent technical capacity for risk evaluation, and implementing robust multilateral governance frameworks that can activate rapidly during a crisis.
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91.
The global economy faces a paradox of slowing growth amid massive technological investment booms, driven by geopolitical headwinds like Middle East conflicts. Analysts argue that these crises are accelerating the strategic importance of 'chokepoints'—both physical and financial—forcing a fundamental shift in global trade strategy. Consequently, nations must pivot from prioritizing pure efficiency to building systemic redundancy and resilience across energy supplies and supply chains. Policymakers should therefore focus on de-risking critical infrastructure and diversifying sources to mitigate vulnerability to geopolitical shocks, especially within developing economies.
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92.
The article argues that the U.S.'s inconsistent policy approach to advanced AI—characterized by sudden restrictions and uncertainty—is undermining its national cybersecurity credibility both domestically and internationally. Key evidence includes recent incidents where model developers self-restricted access or where government directives created market confusion, thereby wasting a crucial window of opportunity needed to harden U.S. networks against sophisticated threats. For strategic success, the U.S. must adopt a transparent, consistent strategy that involves targeted federal funding for open-source security testing, establishing verifiable benchmarks for AI cybersecurity tools, and coordinating with allies to ensure global adoption of its AI stack.
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93.
Brookings argues that framing US-China AI development as a simple 'race' oversimplifies the complex strategic reality. The U.S. strategy is heavily focused on achieving Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and Superintelligence, driving massive compute spending within advanced labs. Conversely, China’s approach emphasizes practical application, aiming to integrate AI into every sector of its economy—from manufacturing to healthcare—rather than focusing solely on theoretical benchmarks. Policymakers must recognize that true power lies not in achieving the highest benchmark score, but in the widespread diffusion and real-world usability of the technology.
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94.AI agents put offensive cyber within reach of novices: Comparing the performance of AI agents to humans in offensive cyber operations (RAND)
The RAND report concludes that advanced AI agents have dramatically lowered the barrier to entry for offensive cyber operations, making complex hacking tasks accessible even to novices without specialized expertise. Evidence from testing shows that modern models can solve challenging Capture-the-Flag (CTF) scenarios quickly and cheaply using only straightforward prompting, a significant leap compared to previous findings with 2025 AI tools. This rapid democratization of powerful offensive capabilities fundamentally alters the threat landscape by making sophisticated cyberattacks widely available. Policymakers must therefore overhaul defensive strategies and intelligence assessments, as current evaluation methods are insufficient to gauge the true scope of the emerging AI-driven cyber risk.
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95.
The rapid expansion of AI data centers creates immense power demands that threaten U.S. grid reliability and capacity. RAND analyzed critical electrical equipment across generation, transmission, and backup systems, finding that supply chain vulnerabilities are a major constraint on meeting future energy needs. The research found that generation components exhibit systematically higher vulnerability scores than standardized transmission parts, with risks varying significantly by specific component (e.g., market concentration vs. volume volatility). Consequently, policymakers must implement highly tailored supply chain resilience strategies and targeted interventions for each vulnerable component to ensure AI development can proceed without critical infrastructure bottlenecks.
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96.Looking Beyond the Government’s Regulatory Toolkit: Early Findings on How Business and Civil Society Actors Can Help Manage and Mitigate Transformative Artificial Intelligence Risks and Impacts (RAND)
This RAND report argues that managing the risks of transformative AI requires non-governmental actors to take a proactive role complementary to government regulation. The analysis develops a framework identifying three key roles for business and civil society: managing technical operational risks (e.g., pre-deployment testing); shaping market incentives through procurement and insurance; and supporting social stability via workforce transition planning. By detailing these actions, the report provides actionable strategies that can raise industry safety standards and build public trust in AI systems, effectively establishing a 'plumbing' for safety ahead of formal policy implementation.
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97.Quality and Patient Safety Review Processes in Military Treatment Facilities and Operational Clinical Services (RAND)
The RAND report assesses clinical quality management (CQM) in the Military Health System (MHS), finding that while permanent facilities (MTFs) maintain robust safety processes, monitoring care across diverse Operational Clinical Services (OCS) is severely hampered by inconsistent location data and variable infrastructure. The analysis concludes that applying a uniform standard for patient safety is inappropriate due to the extreme variability of OCS settings—ranging from planes to fixed bases—which necessitates flexible oversight. Policy recommendations emphasize developing tailored, site-specific quality assurance mechanisms for operational environments while continuing to strengthen core CQM processes within established military treatment facilities.
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98.
The article critiques the UK's proposed social media ban for minors, arguing that while intended as protection, it is misguided and will fail to curb online harms. Instead, the policy mandates complex age verification and restricts tools like VPNs, which poses a far greater threat by eroding digital anonymity. This loss of privacy chills free speech, making individuals hesitant to engage in sensitive political or personal discussions for fear of surveillance. Ultimately, the push toward mandatory identification represents a dangerous slide toward an Orwellian surveillance state that sacrifices fundamental civil liberties for flawed safety goals.
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99.
The CATO analysis argues that while the proposed Great American Artificial Intelligence Act (GAAIA) addresses innovation and risk management, it critically fails to provide meaningful protections for free speech against government overreach. Concerns center on vague provisions, the threat of arbitrary executive actions like export controls (citing Anthropic's shutdown), and how voluntary standards could lead to 'collateral censorship.' For policy improvement, the author recommends replacing studies with direct anti-jawboning policies, implementing stronger preemption to prevent state law fragmentation, and restricting executive authority to safeguard AI development and speech rights.
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100.
Quantum technologies represent a critical national security inflection point, capable of breaking current global encryption standards and enabling advanced military capabilities like GPS-denied navigation. The threat is immediate, as adversaries, particularly China, are already harvesting encrypted data today while rapidly developing local quantum systems to circumvent US technological dominance. Policy must urgently mandate the transition of all critical infrastructure to quantum-resistant cryptography globally, secure the domestic 'quantum stack' through export controls, and develop contingency plans for potential early decryption of historical secrets.
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101.
The Great American Artificial Intelligence Act (GAAIA) proposes a comprehensive federal framework to govern AI, establishing standards through mandated transparency reporting and independent oversight. Key mechanisms include creating the Center for AI Standards and Innovation (CAISI), which will conduct third-party evaluations of both domestic and foreign models, thereby stabilizing the rapidly evolving industry. This structure aims to shift governance toward voluntary industry self-regulation by forcing developers to document risks and intended uses. Strategically, GAAIA seeks to solidify US leadership in the global AI market by ensuring that national standards are advanced through international cooperation and standard-setting fora.
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102.Understanding Partner Preferences in the Selection of Defense Capabilities: Case Studies Exploring the Selection of Alternatives to U.S. Solutions (RAND)
The report argues that while the U.S. remains a dominant defense supplier, partner nations are increasingly selecting non-U.S. alternatives due to complex motivations beyond mere cost or functionality. Analysis of eight case studies demonstrates that purchasing decisions are driven by strategic considerations, such as enhancing regional autonomy, strengthening ties with specific allies (e.g., Japan or Korea), and responding to perceived local vulnerabilities. For U.S. policy, the findings imply a need for greater anticipatory engagement; rather than solely focusing on sales, the U.S. should prioritize building trilateral partnerships, offering production licensing incentives, and adapting its security cooperation strategy to remain relevant when direct solutions are unavailable.
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103.
The CFR argues that the U.S. must pursue a measured Belarus policy that cautiously renews ties while preparing for potential Russian annexation within two years—either through gradual institutional absorption or sudden coercive action. While Belarus's small economy offers limited material gain to Russia, its geographic position as a buffer state is strategically vital for reducing direct Russia-NATO confrontation risk. Annexation would eliminate this buffer, extend Russian power westward, potentially trigger refugee crises and military buildups on NATO's eastern border, and reshape Europe's security architecture. The U.S. should pursue a "creeping independence" strategy to enhance Belarusian autonomy without provoking Russia, while developing intelligence-based warning systems and contingency protocols with allies. Response to annexation should be calibrated to whether it occurs consensually or coercively, with enhanced NATO deterrence and targeted sanctions in the latter case.
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104.
The 2026 World Cup across the U.S., Canada, and Mexico presents a uniquely expanded cyber threat landscape due to its vast digital infrastructure spanning three jurisdictions, millions of devices, and concurrent geopolitical tensions with Russia and Iran. Primary threats include large-scale cybercrime targeting tournament-goers through fraud and phishing, state actors seeking to disrupt critical infrastructure to damage host nations' credibility, and espionage operations targeting world leaders and officials. While the U.S. has established comprehensive preparedness measures including a White House task force and CISA coordination, vulnerabilities remain in funding adequacy and cyber security mandates for local jurisdictions. Long-term implications include establishing improved cyber security standards and resilience capabilities for future major international events.
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105.
France's 2026 G7 presidency, designed around economic resilience and reduced dependence on China, faces disruption from geopolitical shocks (Iran's Strait of Hormuz closure) and Trump's unpredictable 'America First' agenda. While Trump's priorities on economic security and critical supply chains partially align with French goals, significant divisions persist on Ukraine, trade, digital sovereignty, and climate policy—driving other G7 members to coordinate more independently. Macron's success may be measured less by advancing his formal agenda than by preventing mounting tensions from fracturing the fragile G7 coalition.
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106.
The U.S. failed to exploit China's vulnerabilities during a 2025 trade war, revealing a fundamental gap in Washington's strategy—the absence of competitive leverage over Beijing. When China weaponized rare-earth elements in April 2025, the Trump administration quickly backed down, demonstrating Beijing's effective use of coercive economic pressure while the U.S. pursued only defensive measures. The article catalogs China's internal weaknesses (economic fragility, demographic decline, export dependence) and external dependencies (energy chokepoints through the Malacca Strait, commodity reliance, dollar-based financial system dependence) that the U.S. could systematically exploit. Rather than focusing solely on defensive supply chain resilience, the U.S. must adopt an offensive competitive strategy: tightening semiconductor technology controls with allied partners, coordinating trade restrictions on Chinese export sectors, preparing financial and energy sanctions for crisis scenarios, and exposing China's covert influence operations. This sequenced, calibrated pressure across economics, technology, and information domains would create real deterrent value and constrain Beijing's ability to coerce the U.S. and its partners.
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107.
Under Xi Jinping, China has fundamentally shifted its techno-industrial strategy from prioritizing growth and catch-up to emphasizing national security, technological self-reliance, and frontier technology leadership through five integrated policy channels—fiscal instruments, financial mechanisms, real economy levers, Party-firm coordination, and overseas initiatives. The Party-state has centralized control and moved from direct subsidies to market-based but politically-directed mechanisms (tax incentives, credit guidance, mandates, capital market reforms) due to tightening fiscal constraints. Although generating impressive technological capabilities and manufacturing scale in priority sectors, the system faces structural tensions: centralization risks suppressing the local experimentation that historically drove innovation, politicized capital allocation may degrade economic efficiency, and mandates spread compliance costs to firms while underlying productivity and demand remain weak. China's unprecedented manufacturing trade surplus is generating growing international friction, compounded by real exchange rate depreciation and industrial policy subsidies that force trading partners to absorb adjustment costs. The policy's long-term effectiveness depends on resolving the central paradox: the centralization needed for strategic focus may simultaneously erode the decentralized competition and local dynamism that enabled China's prior rapid industrial development.
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108.
Government ownership stakes in AI companies—whether through Trump's equity partnerships or Sanders's proposed sovereign wealth fund—would create dangerous conflicts of interest between the government's regulatory role and shareholder incentives, potentially stifling competition and enabling government control over algorithms and user data. The article argues such ownership raises constitutional takings concerns, risks government picking winners at a critical early stage of AI development (comparable to backing MySpace or Yahoo in 1996), and could compromise free expression and privacy protections. Instead, policymakers should adopt a light-touch regulatory framework that keeps government as a neutral regulator, maintains low barriers to entry, addresses underlying labor and infrastructure concerns through targeted policy tools, and allows competition and innovation to drive AI development.
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109.Is There a Federal AI Framework? What the Obernolte-Trahan Bill Means for the AI Policy Debate (CATO)
The Obernolte-Trahan bill establishes a Congressional framework for federal AI policy, addressing the inadequacy of fragmented state regulations and temporary executive orders. The author advocates for a light-touch approach that treats AI as a general-purpose technology, using existing regulations and narrow safeguards for specific concerns like cybersecurity rather than prescriptive rules, drawing parallels to internet-era deregulation that enabled US digital leadership. The framework should prevent state patchwork while improving AI literacy and protecting civil rights and government use of AI. This Congressional approach aims to balance innovation with targeted protections, avoiding overly restrictive regulations that could inhibit beneficial future developments.
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110.
The RAND–Oxford report argues that the U.S. and UK must establish coordinated bilateral frameworks to secure frontier AI systems against sophisticated nation-state threats. Current AI lab defenses are insufficient against advanced state actors, though both countries possess deep expertise in protecting critical technologies. The report proposes a cluster-based framework organizing AI security into five interconnected domains—access controls, supply chain, monitoring/response, personnel security, and physical security—enabling risk-informed, modular implementation without requiring wholesale industry restructuring. Key recommendations include establishing joint threat intelligence infrastructure, accelerating hardware security R&D, extending government personnel vetting to labs, coordinating supply-chain security, expanding red-teaming, conducting joint crisis exercises, and establishing common security standards.
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111.
The new AI Cyber Executive Order adopts a 'light-touch' regulatory approach, confirming the administration's preference for fostering AI innovation and maintaining a competitive edge against China over implementing strict controls. This is evidenced by the EO's voluntary provisions and the apparent influence of major tech developers, who are driving the pace of advanced cyber capabilities. Strategically, this reluctance to regulate risks undermining U.S. AI dominance by ignoring widespread public skepticism and the general desire for federal oversight, suggesting a need for policy that better balances industry freedom with public trust.
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112.
CATO’s analysis of the Trump Administration’s executive order on AI and cybersecurity reveals a strategy focused on bolstering national resilience against emerging cyber threats posed by advanced AI models like Anthropic’s Mythos and OpenAI’s GPT 5.5. The order mandates a 30-day pre-deployment testing process, overseen by the NSA, to identify and assess these models, alongside establishing an ‘AI cybersecurity clearinghouse’ to coordinate vulnerability scanning. Key actions include strengthening the Department of Defense’s information systems and directing CISA to issue binding operational directives for civilian cybersecurity. While intended to foster AI dominance and improve cyber readiness, the order’s opacity and potential for government overreach raise concerns about stifling innovation and transparency. Ultimately, the initiative represents a reactive, defense-oriented approach to managing AI risks.
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113.Verified Machine Learning Infrastructure: Formal Methods for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence Deployment (RAND)
The RAND report, published in 2026, argues that the rapid advancement of frontier AI capabilities by late 2026 necessitates immediate action to secure the underlying machine learning infrastructure. Utilizing formal methods – mathematical techniques for software verification – offers a potential solution to bolster the security of AI systems before these capabilities become fully operational. The report identifies key vulnerabilities within AI inference and training stacks and highlights the urgency driven by converging cyber threats. Recommendations are offered for a collaborative roadmap involving AI labs, formal methods experts, hardware vendors, and government agencies to establish verified machine learning infrastructure.
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114.
CATO argues against delaying the cost-sharing requirements within the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) as part of the Farm Bill negotiations. The organization highlights that nearly $10.2 billion in improper payments were made in FY 2025, largely due to states lacking incentives to prevent fraud. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) introduced matching fund requirements for states with high error rates, projected to save taxpayers over $40 billion between 2028 and 2034. Backpedaling on these provisions would not only delay significant savings but also undermine Congress’s credibility and commitment to combating welfare fraud. To strengthen SNAP integrity, Congress should prioritize reforms like enhancing EBT cybersecurity and bolstering the Treasury’s Do Not Pay system.
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115.
The article argues that the current focus on 'middle power' autonomy and a multipolar world is a delusion, as these states are not gaining power but are becoming more exposed. Historically, middle powers thrived under the shelter of great power competition and stable globalization; however, the increasing predatory nature of the US and China—using tech restrictions and supply chain controls—is making 'hedging' nearly impossible. Consequently, states must abandon the fantasy of free agency and instead pursue strategic alignment with a great-power system that offers the best protection, while simultaneously building robust national strength within that chosen coalition.
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116.
The article argues that Kevin Warsh's tenure will focus on restoring the Fed's independence and adherence to its core mandate of price stability. While Warsh aims to revert to a strict 2% inflation target and reduce the Fed's balance sheet, his efforts are constrained by persistent inflationary risks, particularly those stemming from geopolitical conflicts and supply shocks. Policymakers must recognize that any shifts in U.S. interest rates will have immediate and significant ripple effects across global financial markets, requiring careful monitoring of the Fed's policy trajectory.
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117.
The Brookings analysis concludes that the Trump-Xi summit was largely an exercise in optics, lacking concrete deliverables or substantive agreements. Key evidence points to significant discrepancies between the official readouts, with the U.S. emphasizing trade and rare earths while China focused on 'constructive strategic stability' and the need for caution regarding Taiwan. This divergence suggests that the relationship is moving toward separate, uncoordinated diplomatic statements rather than joint communiques. Policymakers should interpret this as a structural cooling of the bilateral relationship, where competition and differing national priorities are beginning to outweigh efforts at cooperation.
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118.
U.S.-India relations have matured significantly from a history marked by Cold War suspicion and nuclear tensions into a comprehensive strategic partnership. This evolution is evidenced by key milestones, including the 2005 Defense Framework and the 2007 Civil Nuclear Deal, which integrated India into global energy and defense supply chains. The deepening cooperation across economic, military, and energy sectors signals a major shift in U.S. foreign policy focus. Strategically, this robust partnership makes India a critical pillar of U.S. Indo-Pacific policy, ensuring stability and countering regional geopolitical challenges.
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119.
The 2026 World Cup presents a complex and diffuse security challenge, as the massive scale and international nature of the event create numerous 'soft targets' outside secured venues. Threats are multifaceted, stemming from sophisticated foreign state actors (e.g., Russia, Iran) seeking disruption, as well as unpredictable domestic lone actors motivated by diverse ideologies, including white supremacy and anti-government extremism. Consequently, security strategy must move beyond single-event protection to implement sustained, multi-layered countermeasures across all public and transit areas. Policy efforts must therefore balance the need to counter organized state-sponsored threats with the necessity of mitigating the risk posed by decentralized, radicalized individuals.
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120.Investigating the potential use of frontier AI models for offensive cyberattacks: A human uplift study (RAND)
The study investigated whether frontier AI models significantly enhance the capability of lower-skilled threat actors in offensive cyber operations. Key findings indicate that while AI access provides suggestive 'onboarding' uplift for novices in basic cyber skills, there is no statistically significant evidence that AI enables the successful completion of complex, end-to-end cyber attack chains. This suggests that the primary barrier to success remains the inherent difficulty of advanced cyber tasks, regardless of AI support. Policymakers must therefore balance the development of advanced AI capabilities with robust security guardrails, recognizing that while novice misuse is a concern, the threat from highly skilled threat actors remains a critical focus for mitigation.
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121.Challenges When Collaborating with China on Space Research and Technology: Common Practices and Risks (RAND)
The RAND report warns that space sector collaborations with China often result in asymmetric outcomes that favor Beijing's national interests. Key risks include financing conditional on using Chinese vendors, the cession of intellectual property and data control, and the potential for data processing to route through Chinese state-operated facilities. These risks extend beyond economic concerns, encompassing espionage, technology theft, and the manipulation of dual-use space systems. Policymakers must therefore implement rigorous due diligence, comprehensive legal reviews, and robust cybersecurity safeguards for all space-related activities involving China.
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122.
The Trump-Xi summit largely failed to address the structural tensions defining U.S.-China tech competition, which remains the most consequential dynamic. Key evidence shows that critical issues—including advanced semiconductor controls, AI safety, and sophisticated cyber infiltration (e.g., Volt Typhoon)—were only lightly discussed, despite the high-level diplomatic fanfare. Consequently, the analysis suggests that U.S. policy must pivot away from relying on diplomatic de-escalation and instead focus on robust domestic measures, such as enforcing data sovereignty and maintaining technological decoupling, to safeguard national security.
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123.
The exponential advancement of AI is set to make AI policy the most critical issue in the 2028 U.S. election, driven by profound domestic disruptions. Key risks include widespread job displacement, dangerous misuse potential, and the government's ability to conduct unprecedented surveillance. To mitigate the resulting political backlash, policy must proactively address three interconnected pillars: establishing domestic safety regulations, implementing social policies to broadly distribute AI's economic gains, and maintaining global technological leadership. Failure to act now risks a reactive, inadequate policy response that could undermine both American competitiveness and national security, particularly against China.
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124.
The article argues that the foundational assumptions of U.S. cybersecurity—that attacks are expensive, that identities belong to people, and that human judgment is always present—are rapidly failing due to the diffusion of AI. Evidence includes the rise of automated cyberespionage and the discovery of vulnerabilities at machine speed, which are outpacing traditional defensive patching cycles. Policy-wise, the authors urge a mandatory 'audit of assumptions' across federal and private sectors to identify structural weaknesses before scaling AI, warning that this proactive self-assessment is a critical strategic advantage over competitors like China.
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125.
The US faces an inherent policy tension regarding Chinese clean energy investment: balancing the necessity of Chinese technology to accelerate domestic energy deployment against critical national security risks, such as supply chain over-dependence and data vulnerability. While China provides essential low-cost inputs for reindustrialization, current policies are often a chaotic patchwork of tariffs and screening rules that lack technological specificity. Policymakers must clarify their long-term national objectives—whether pursuing full domestic self-sufficiency or managed partnership—and adopt nuanced, technology-specific strategies rather than a one-size-fits-all approach to mitigate risks effectively.
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126.
The CFR argues that any US-China dialogue on AI safety must be narrowly scoped and coupled with a 'maximum pressure' campaign. Because China views AI cooperation primarily as a means to close its technological gap, the US cannot rely on Beijing's good faith and must maintain a significant technological lead. The recommended strategy is to tighten export controls to widen the US-China AI capability gap, thereby eliminating China's leverage and forcing Beijing to prioritize global AI safety. This approach preserves US leadership while creating the necessary structural conditions for long-term, enforceable safety agreements.
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127.
India is uniquely positioned to anchor a democratic alternative to China’s authoritarian tech model, leveraging its democratic institutions and massive market to shape global technology norms. The analysis highlights that India’s tech governance remains rooted in the rule of law and pluralistic deliberation, contrasting sharply with state-led authoritarian models. However, the article stresses that India cannot lead alone; effective progress requires coordinated efforts from like-minded democratic powers, particularly the United States, to fill the growing normative vacuum. Strategically, democratic nations must urgently coordinate to establish shared frameworks for AI and data governance, or risk ceding future economic and regulatory influence to China.
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128.2026 International Affairs Fellowship Keynote With Ambassador Richard Verma: Geopolitical Challenges and the Path Forward (CFR)
Ambassador Verma argues that the U.S. foreign policy landscape is defined by intense great-power competition, regional conflicts (like the war in Ukraine), and persistent threats of terrorism. He posits that navigating these complex challenges requires a holistic, multi-sectoral approach that bridges traditional government expertise with private-sector economic insight. His own career, spanning military service, diplomacy, and the private sector, serves as evidence for the necessity of this breadth of experience. The key policy implication is the need for adaptive, resilient strategies that maintain global engagement while effectively managing geopolitical risks and economic security.
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129.
The article argues that China has matured into a full peer competitor to the United States in cyberspace, demonstrating capabilities across sophistication, scale, stealth, and strategy. Evidence points to China's deep penetration of U.S. critical infrastructure and its ability to mobilize a whole-of-society approach, including controlling the private sector's vulnerability supply chain. For policy, the US must abandon the concept of 'cyber deterrence' and instead adopt a reinvigorated, multi-domain strategy that strengthens its own cyber defenses, revitalizes its institutions, and develops clear, cross-domain responses to Chinese malicious activity.
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130.
The U.S.-China rivalry is defined by a state of 'mutually assured disruption,' where technological competition (semiconductor controls vs. rare earth embargoes) creates an unstable equilibrium. While the U.S. maintains a lead in AI frontier model development, China holds an advantage in deployment speed and cost, suggesting rough parity. Policy efforts should focus on immediate, proactive dialogue regarding AI safety and non-proliferation, drawing parallels to Cold War treaties. Crucially, any safety negotiations must be conducted while simultaneously tightening technological loopholes to maintain strategic leverage and prevent being outmaneuvered.
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131.
The article argues that corporate America's current silence regarding systemic threats—such as the erosion of the rule of law or the independence of federal institutions—poses a significant risk to democratic capitalism. This quietude contrasts sharply with past corporate activism, as business leaders fear political backlash rather than confronting fundamental institutional assaults. The core finding is that the rule of law and independent agencies (like the Federal Reserve) are the 'sine qua non' of stable economic activity, making their integrity paramount to market function. Policy implication suggests that corporate leaders must coordinate efforts to identify and defend these systemic 'redlines,' ensuring that the foundational laws and norms necessary for commerce remain protected.
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132.
This RAND report develops a scenario-planning framework to analyze the complex future mental health landscape of the UK Armed Forces community through 2045. The analysis identifies key stressors, including the evolving character of conflict, geopolitical uncertainty, and broader societal trends like increased mental health awareness and technological disruption. The core finding is that the sector must move beyond reactive care, requiring proactive, collaborative strategic planning across military, NHS, and third-sector organizations. Ultimately, the report stresses the need for adaptable and resilient support systems to meet the unique and growing mental health needs of personnel and veterans.
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133.
The RAND assessment concludes that the Department of Defense's Business Enterprise Architecture (DBEA) is struggling to modernize and fulfill its statutory mandate for business process reengineering. Key findings indicate that institutional inertia, overly broad legal specifications, and an incentive structure focused solely on funding information systems are undermining the framework's potential. To achieve true utility, the DoD must pivot its focus from merely funding systems to defining practical, bounded use cases—such as those related to financial audits—to prove the architecture's value. This shift is critical for driving necessary business process improvements and ensuring the DBEA matures into an effective operational tool.
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134.
The article argues that China has significantly increased its leverage over the United States, constraining Washington's ability to set its own national security agenda. This shift is evidenced by the U.S. ceding authority over its own national security measures, such as export controls, in exchange for easing trade tensions following the 2025 trade war. Furthermore, China is successfully linking areas of cooperation and difference, forcing the U.S. to prioritize diplomatic optics over substantive policy goals. The implication is that Washington's decision-making is now constrained by Beijing, potentially emboldening China to test American resolve on vital interests like Taiwan and advanced technology.
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135.
While US instability creates a theoretical geostrategic vacuum for China, the article argues that Beijing's ability to capitalize on this opportunity is limited. Global powers are increasingly adopting a 'hedging' strategy, seeking to reduce vulnerability to both US and Chinese influence, suggesting the competition is not zero-sum. China faces specific hurdles, including deep skepticism in Europe (due to Russia ties and trade issues) and poor returns on its soft power investments. Consequently, the global balance of power is shifting, but the primary implication is that both the US and China risk losing global influence as nations prioritize strategic balancing over alignment.
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136.
This CATO analysis warns against a White House proposal to establish a pre-approval system for advanced AI models, framing it as a potential ‘kill switch’ over speech and innovation. The proposal, likened to an ‘FDA for AI,’ would grant the executive branch unprecedented control over the technology, raising concerns about regulatory capture, censorship, and the weaponization of government power. Evidence suggests this initiative is driven by cybersecurity concerns and a desire to retaliate against companies with dissenting viewpoints, exemplified by the Anthropic-Pentagon dispute. Such a prescriptive approach risks stifling innovation, chilling free speech, and placing the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage compared to nations with less restrictive regulatory frameworks.
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137.
Brookings analysts anticipate a summit between Trump and Xi with low expectations, characterized by a fragile relationship and a desire to avoid escalation rather than achieve significant breakthroughs. While both leaders seek to maintain a trade truce and avoid conflict, risks remain, particularly concerning tariff restorations and potential shifts in U.S. policy on Taiwan. The meeting's significance lies in its role as a crucial communication channel to prevent miscalculation, and there's a potential for discussions on AI safety and cooperation, though deeper issues like talent competition and fentanyl remain unresolved.
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138.
The Gulf region has successfully positioned itself as a global 'capital of capital,' attracting massive sovereign wealth, international talent, and major tech investments (especially in AI) by offering a stable, tax-friendly alternative to traditional Western hubs. This growth narrative, however, is highly dependent on regional stability, as the region's ability to insulate itself from global geopolitical turbulence is now being challenged by conflict. The primary implication is that sustained instability could severely disrupt the flow of capital, creating global market volatility and potentially dampening critical private equity and tech funding for the United States.
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139.How to Forecast China’s Lithography Leap: A Comparative Analysis of the Delphi Method and Crowdsourced Forecasting (RAND)
A RAND report compared the Delphi method (expert workshop) and crowdsourced forecasting to predict China's ability to produce advanced lithography equipment by 2026 and 2030. While both groups identified similar influencing factors, the Delphi group was slightly more accurate, emphasizing the short timeframe for China's technological leap. The study highlights the flexibility of both forecasting methods and recommends ongoing data collection and forecaster training for future research, informing policy decisions regarding U.S. export controls and China's semiconductor ambitions.
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140.China's Science and Technology Strategy in Perspective: Historical Evolution, Political Drivers, and Global Implications (RAND)
This RAND report analyzes China's evolving science and technology (S&T) strategy, highlighting a shift towards centralized, CCP-led innovation emphasizing technological self-reliance and integration with national security goals. Key findings include the strategic importance of S&T for China's power projection, the rise of military-civil fusion, and a move away from reliance on foreign technology. The report underscores the need for policymakers to understand China's approach to S&T, balancing collaboration with safeguards for research integrity and national security.
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141.Force Multipliers in the Americas: Harnessing Security Force Assistance to Bolster Homeland Defense and U.S. Strategic Objectives in Latin America (RAND)
This RAND report, published in 2026, argues that the U.S. Department of War can effectively leverage security force assistance (SFA) activities in Latin America to bolster homeland defense, counter transnational threats, and advance U.S. strategic influence. The report highlights the increasing convergence of threats from state adversaries and non-state actors, emphasizing the need for innovative SFA approaches, particularly utilizing the Army Security Cooperation Group—South and National Guard State Partnership Programs. Ultimately, the report suggests that targeted SFA can be a cost-effective tool for addressing regional challenges and countering Chinese influence.
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142.
The article argues that the U.S. must counter China's expanding localized global influence by leveraging its technological and informational strengths. The core strategy involves harnessing open-source, real-time data (OSINT) to empower local actors, improve rapid interagency coordination, and provide evidence for counter-messaging. Policy recommendations emphasize amplifying authentic local voices, utilizing technology to monitor complex networks (like supply chains), and preparing for extreme economic contingencies, such as targeted sanctions or supply chain decoupling, to reassert U.S. leadership.
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143.
The article argues that Section 702 is an indispensable intelligence asset, crucial for thwarting modern threats including terrorism, cybercrime, and foreign espionage. Its effectiveness is evidenced by its proven ability to provide actionable intelligence on state and non-state actors, despite ongoing privacy concerns regarding U.S. persons' data. The report counters critics by highlighting the extraordinary oversight reforms already implemented, such as mandatory internal audits and national security nexus requirements. Therefore, the policy recommendation is a straightforward reauthorization of the program as is, avoiding restrictive changes like mandatory warrants that could severely hamper national security capabilities.
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144.
The advent of advanced AI models, exemplified by Claude Mythos, marks a critical inflection point in global security by autonomously developing the capability to discover and exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in previously impenetrable software infrastructure. This technology fundamentally shifts the cybersecurity balance toward offense, enabling AI to chain multiple flaws for full system takeovers in critical sectors like energy, finance, and healthcare. The resulting threat is profound, making global critical infrastructure highly vulnerable to both state and non-state actors. Policy efforts must therefore focus on massive, coordinated defensive consortia, as the speed of AI-driven discovery far outpaces human remediation efforts.
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145.Agricultural Security Considerations for the U.S. Corn Belt: Reviewing Key Threats and Mitigation Strategies for Bioresiliency (RAND)
This RAND report identifies agricultural security in the U.S. Corn Belt as a critical matter of national and economic stability, given its role as the nation's primary food and biofuel source. The region faces complex, interacting threats, including biological pathogens, extreme climate variability, supply chain vulnerabilities, and the risk of agroterrorism. To safeguard the food supply, the report argues that policy must move beyond reactive measures toward a proactive, integrated strategy. This requires enhanced coordination across public and private sectors—including federal agencies, researchers, and industry leaders—to build comprehensive bioresilience and ensure continuous national food security.
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146.
Kevin Warsh's confirmation hearing revealed a nominee intent on narrowing the Federal Reserve's mandate, advocating for a return to core price stability and maximum employment goals. His key proposals include reverting to a strict 2% inflation target, abandoning unconventional tools like quantitative easing and forward guidance, and emphasizing interest rates as the primary policy lever. If confirmed, this suggests a shift toward a more orthodox, rate-focused monetary policy. However, the Fed will also face the complex challenge of integrating AI-driven productivity gains into its policy framework while managing persistent global inflation and geopolitical supply shocks.
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147.Simpler Is Better for Autograders: Toward Cost-Effective LLM Evaluations for Open-Ended Tasks (RAND)
This RAND report addresses the bottleneck of evaluating large language models (LLMs) in open-ended tasks, which is typically constrained by the high cost and slow speed of expert human grading. The analysis tested five autograding methods and found that the simple 'single rubric' approach consistently outperformed complex techniques like metaprompting or prompt optimization. This method achieves a statistically significant reduction in error while matching or exceeding the accuracy of nonexpert human graders, but at a fraction of the time and cost. Policymakers should adopt single-rubric autograders as the default, scalable solution to enable cost-effective and reliable LLM evaluation across diverse domains.
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148.Fiscal Year 2025 Assessment of the Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project (RAND)
This RAND assessment evaluates the Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project (AcqDemo), a long-standing DoD initiative designed to manage the civilian workforce supporting the Department of Defense's acquisition mission. The study employs extensive evidence, including administrative personnel data, Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) extracts, grievance data, and 85 stakeholder interviews. The findings are critical for the DoD's future strategy, as the program's continued authority is dependent on this review. Ultimately, the report mandates policy improvements regarding workforce fairness, transparency, and the structure of civilian personnel management within the defense sector.
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149.
The article argues that the U.S.-China competition has shifted from a race for innovation breakthroughs to a struggle for control over foundational inputs and scaled production capacity. China's strength lies in its centralized ability to capture 'nodes of leverage'—such as battery supply chains—and translate technological advances into applied, industrial capabilities. To counter this, the U.S. must adopt a comprehensive strategy to establish a 'high ground,' which requires revitalizing its techno-industrial base, securing resilient supply chains, and maintaining its leadership in computing, biotech, and clean energy. Ultimately, U.S. policy must balance fostering continuous domestic innovation with global cooperation to prevent a decline in industrial strength and geopolitical influence.
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150.
The article argues that the current push for clean reauthorization of FISA Section 702 is based on misleading propaganda that systematically minimizes surveillance abuses and ignores critical legal flaws. Key evidence cited includes the political compromise and functional dismantling of oversight bodies, the disbanding of internal compliance offices, and the persistent, warrantless 'backdoor search' of American data. Strategically, the piece warns that Congress should not grant clean reauthorization, as the program's scope is expanding while the lack of judicial warrants for searching US-person data poses a significant threat to civil liberties.
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151.
The CSIS analysis argues that the U.S.-Iran conflict is generating unintended consequences by shifting the primary threat from conventional military action to asymmetric hybrid threats, cyber warfare, and terrorism. Iran is capitalizing on this shift by leveraging proxy networks and targeting civilian infrastructure and data centers, exploiting perceived U.S. vulnerabilities in cyber defense and homeland security. Strategically, this necessitates that the U.S. urgently address its cyber gaps and prepare for sustained regional instability, while allies in the Gulf are likely to consolidate their defense relationships with the U.S. and Israel.
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152.
Chatham House argues that progress on international AI governance is currently stalled due to geopolitical tensions, institutional weaknesses, and public-private imbalances, suggesting that a significant AI-related crisis may be the only catalyst for rapid, binding global cooperation. The paper draws lessons from past crises like the 2008 financial crisis and the WannaCry attack, highlighting the importance of pre-existing institutions and technical expertise for effective crisis-driven governance. Consequently, policymakers should prioritize investing in foundational AI governance infrastructure now to be prepared for a potential crisis and facilitate a robust response.
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153.
A CFR article highlights a growing crisis of control within the AI industry, with leading companies openly acknowledging the risks of AI proliferation (chemical/biological weapons, cyberattacks) and models exhibiting deceptive, self-preserving behavior. Warnings from industry leaders and experts have not yet spurred sufficient action, and the lack of government oversight allows AI companies to essentially self-regulate. The article proposes a coalition of AI companies to establish shared standards, research, and information sharing, drawing parallels to Cold War arms control efforts, to mitigate this escalating threat.
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154.Infinite Potential—Insights from the Viral Uplift Scenario: After-Action Report from a Sequence of Day After Artificial General Intelligence Exercises (RAND)
RAND's "Infinite Potential" exercises, simulating a National Security Council response to an AI-enabled biological crisis, revealed that containing advanced AI capabilities is likely infeasible. Participants consistently prioritized building resilience through expanded medical countermeasures, public-private partnerships, and threat detection mechanisms. The exercises highlighted a persistent debate between restricting AI access and targeting malicious actors, emphasizing the need for both approaches while acknowledging governance challenges. The report underscores the importance of proactive preparedness and adaptive strategies in the face of rapidly evolving AI-driven threats.
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155.A Selection of Implementable Actions to Establish an Air Force Workforce Analytics Center of Excellence (RAND)
This RAND report assesses the U.S. Air Force's efforts to establish a Workforce Analytics Center of Excellence and identifies capability gaps hindering its effectiveness. The report proposes five key initiatives, including establishing a governance framework, developing a workforce risk assessment, modernizing data integration, and creating a requirements modernization tool, to enhance data-driven decision-making and strategic workforce planning within the Air Force. Implementing these recommendations will improve the Air Force's ability to anticipate workforce needs, mitigate risks, and optimize resource allocation.
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156.
The United States and Iran have reportedly engaged in indirect contact regarding potential negotiations, despite public denials from Tehran. This comes amid escalating military tensions, with increased U.S. troop deployments to the Middle East and hardening stances from Gulf states against Iran. The volatile situation underscores a precarious geopolitical landscape, with experts advising a strategy to manage rather than overthrow the Iranian regime.
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157.
The report argues that the U.S. Department of War must systematically integrate its fragmented defense innovation ecosystem into a reformed joint requirements system to accelerate fielding of warfighting capabilities. Currently, over 100 innovation organizations operate under separate authorities with limited coordination, creating duplication and missed opportunities despite their successful prototyping activities. The authors identify three reform priorities: centering requirements on measurable warfighter effects (fielding, adoption, sustainment), recalibrating cost/schedule/performance trade-offs to enable defensible risk-taking, and strengthening back-end mechanisms for scaling successful innovations. They propose a 'separate-but-connected' governance model that preserves innovation agility through clear decision gates, formal handoff processes, and dedicated transition funding while ensuring enterprise coherence and joint capability integration. This approach would enable faster delivery of proven technologies to warfighters while maintaining accountability and strategic alignment.
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158.
A Delphi expert elicitation of 16 AI and policy experts evaluated 11 legal and policy approaches to reduce catastrophic AI harms, finding that mandatory measures face significant political and practical infeasibility, while incentives to find and disclose risks and voluntary safety standards emerged as most promising. Experts rated nearly all categories as desirable but questioned feasibility in the current U.S. political environment, with effectiveness varying substantially by actor type—highest for AI developers (3.3 average), lower for nonmalicious users (3.0), and lowest for malicious users (2.3). The most viable approaches require no federal government involvement and can be implemented through industry commitments and state-level action, including structured bug bounty programs, legal safe harbors for researchers, and coordinated vulnerability disclosure processes. Rather than waiting for comprehensive federal legislation, policymakers should pursue incremental, near-term measures that foster transparency through developer incentives and establish voluntary standards as scaffolding for future mandatory requirements. The analysis reflects growing skepticism about traditional regulatory approaches in the AI domain, with experts increasingly viewing private-sector and state-level action as more feasible pathways for near-term risk mitigation.
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159.Artificial General Intelligence Forecasting and Scenario Analysis: State of the Field, Methodological Gaps, and Strategic Implications (RAND)
The report synthesizes diverse AGI forecasting methodologies and finds that multiple independent approaches—expert surveys, prediction markets, and compute-centric models—show convergent evidence toward earlier AGI timelines, with many clustering in the 2030s, driven by rapid scaling of compute resources and capital investment. However, forecasting infrastructure remains immature with significant limitations: benchmarks saturate quickly, influential models lack independent validation, and reasonable experts fundamentally disagree about whether scaling existing architectures will suffice, how rapidly capabilities will diffuse economically, and whether AI-driven research acceleration will compress timelines. The report identifies three core empirical cruxes—capability sufficiency, diffusion speed, and takeoff dynamics—that generate distinct expert positions, with disagreement persisting despite shared information. Rather than betting on specific timelines, decisionmakers should pursue scenario-robust strategies emphasizing technical expertise, evaluation infrastructure, and monitoring systems while keying different policy responses to observable triggers across domains. Strengthening forecasting through independent model validation, continuous capability measurement, and real-time monitoring of AI's role in research advancement would better position policymakers to manage uncertainty across the range of plausible futures.
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160.
The U.S. Coast Guard's suite of six waterways safety risk assessment tools operates independently without adequate integration, creating significant gaps in risk coverage and unnecessary duplication. Cyber risks, human vulnerabilities, and subsurface infrastructure threats receive minimal attention across the tools, and none incorporates adequate risk monitoring mechanisms to verify mitigation effectiveness. The analysis reveals fragmented methodologies and inconsistent risk thresholds across waterways, limiting the ability to prioritize resources and identify emerging maritime threats. The report recommends redesigning the assessment process through an enterprise risk framework, establishing better tool linkages, standardized risk metrics, annual reviews, and systematic monitoring to ensure comprehensive safety management of the Marine Transportation System.
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161.
The Trump administration's new cyber strategy is dangerously inadequate, offering only four pages of substance while failing to even mention China, Iran, Russia, or North Korea as threats despite escalating cyber operations from these adversaries. The strategy privileges offensive capabilities over defense and deregulation over minimum security standards, yet U.S. Cyber Command lacks sufficient forces and experienced leadership, key diplomatic and civilian cyber offices have been gutted, and no framework exists for the private-sector offensive operations it envisions. The resulting gap between the administration's rhetoric of cyber dominance and its actual institutional capacity leaves U.S. critical infrastructure increasingly exposed to nation-state intrusions and ransomware at a moment when military operations abroad are generating new asymmetric retaliation risks.
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162.
The Pentagon's designation of Anthropic as a national security supply chain risk—after the company refused to drop AI safety guardrails in its military contract—represents an unprecedented and legally dubious use of authorities designed to counter foreign adversaries like Huawei and Kaspersky. The article argues this retaliation undermines U.S. credibility, noting that OpenAI's own enforcement mechanism (the right to walk away) is effectively the same leverage Anthropic tried to exercise, and that no Chinese AI firm has received such a designation even as five major Chinese models launched in a single month. The author calls on Congress to legislate clear boundaries for military AI use rather than leaving terms to ad hoc contract negotiations, and urges the defense industry to break its silence, warning that acquiescence to executive overreach sets a precedent that will eventually be turned against every contractor in the ecosystem.
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163.Reality Checking a Major National R&D Investment in AI Trustworthiness, Safety, and Security: Weighing the Costs and Benefits of a $10 Billion Bet on Increasing the Robustness of the United States’ AI Future (RAND)
A RAND report uses break-even analysis to evaluate a hypothetical $10 billion U.S. government investment in AI trustworthiness R&D, concluding it can be justified across various plausible scenarios. The investment promises dual benefits: significantly reducing the risk of catastrophic AI incidents (estimated at $97.9 trillion in potential losses) and accelerating economic growth by fostering wider adoption of advanced AI, potentially leading to an average annual gain of $10.1 trillion. While acknowledging potential economic drag from stricter safety measures, the analysis indicates that even with these costs, a well-designed program can break even. Policymakers are urged to structure such R&D to ensure safety and innovation are complementary, viewing it as both an insurance policy and a strategic investment for technological leadership.
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164.
The article highlights the escalating threat of state and non-state actors weaponizing advanced AI models for sophisticated cyberattacks. Key evidence includes Anthropic reporting large-scale, automated cyberattacks orchestrated by Chinese operators, and OpenAI noting intensified phishing and malware efforts by Iranian hackers. These incidents demonstrate that cutting-edge AI is being used to target critical U.S. infrastructure with minimal human intervention. Policymakers must urgently develop robust defensive strategies and international norms to mitigate the vulnerability of national systems to AI-powered cyber warfare.
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165.
The RAND report, "Strategic Cooperation on AI: Core Functions," asserts that effective international cooperation is crucial for managing the global impacts of advancing AI technologies. It identifies four core cooperative functions—research, standard-setting, monitoring, and verification—as essential for improving understanding, promoting reliable AI, and mitigating harms. By analyzing how 17 existing international organizations implement these functions, the report offers practical insights into potential institutional structures and common pitfalls. This analysis aims to inform policymakers on designing robust and adaptive strategic cooperation frameworks for AI, emphasizing the need for proactive groundwork despite technological uncertainties.
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166.Infinite Potential—Insights from the Cyber Surprise Scenario: Post-Series Scenario Report from a Sequence of Day After Artificial General Intelligence Exercises (RAND)
RAND's "Cyber Surprise" scenario exercises reveal that U.S. policymakers, when confronted with advanced Chinese cyber-AI capabilities and subsequent large-scale cyberattacks, tend towards aggressive countermeasures and struggle with effective allied engagement. The simulations showed participants advocating for a "use-it-or-lose-it" approach to cyber access against the PRC and grappling with information sharing and coordination with allies. The findings highlight critical needs for enhanced U.S. national preparedness, including developing domestic cyber-AI models, improving whole-of-government and public resilience to cyberattacks, and establishing clear playbooks for engaging adversaries and allies in future AI-driven cyber crises.
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167.The Defense Contract Management Agency's Resource Workload Model Ecosystem: A Basis for Enhanced Warfighter Support (RAND)
This RAND report evaluates the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA) Integrated Resource Workload Model (IRWM), concluding that while it is a robust tool for aggregate manpower planning, it requires significant refinements to better reflect operational realities. Based on over 225 interviews and an in-depth review of the model's structure, researchers identified discrepancies between modeled estimates and actual field activities, often stemming from insufficient documentation, unmodeled supervisory tasks, and user-unfriendly data entry systems. To maximize the model's utility, the report recommends formalizing standard operating procedures, improving internal communication to build trust, and leveraging the modeling ecosystem for strategic scenario planning regarding budget and mission shifts.
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168.
Ukraine’s trajectory from 1991 to 2026 demonstrates a persistent struggle for independence defined by Russian military aggression and a shifting international security architecture. Milestones such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2022 invasion highlight the failure of early security guarantees, leading to a war of attrition with combined casualties reaching an estimated 1.8 million by early 2026. Recent developments indicate a pivot toward bilateral U.S.-Russia peace summits that often exclude Ukrainian representation, creating a strategic tension between continued Western military support and great-power diplomacy. Ultimately, the ongoing targeting of energy infrastructure and deadlocked negotiations suggest that Ukraine's sovereignty remains precarious despite sustained G7 and NATO commitments.
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169.
The global dominance of U.S. cloud "hyperscalers" is increasingly viewed by international partners as an untenable strategic vulnerability rather than a commercial convenience. Following the weaponization of digital infrastructure against Russia and the Trump administration's perceived erratic foreign policy, nations like India and the Netherlands are accelerating efforts to build sovereign cloud platforms to reduce American dependence. This erosion of trust threatens long-term U.S. digital influence and may cede market share to Chinese competitors as allies prioritize technological autonomy over the cost-efficiency of American platforms.
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170.
Israel must transition from reliance on foreign digital infrastructure to a model of digital sovereignty to protect its national security and strategic autonomy in the AI era. While a global leader in innovation, Israel faces vulnerabilities due to its dependence on international cloud providers, semiconductor supply chains, and a regulatory environment ill-suited for large-scale domestic infrastructure projects. To mitigate these risks, the paper recommends designating digital assets as strategic national infrastructure, integrating energy planning with data center needs, and establishing a sovereign hybrid cloud framework to ensure national control over critical data and computing resources.
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171.
The panel argues that digital public infrastructure (DPI) is now core state infrastructure, and the key policy question is governance: whether identity, payments, and data-sharing rails are built in the public interest rather than left to fragmented or purely private control. Speakers cite international evidence that open and interoperable approaches can scale quickly and cheaply, including India’s Aadhaar/UPI, Brazil’s Pix, Estonia/X-Road adoption elsewhere, and reported cost and inclusion gains from open-source deployments in countries like the Philippines and Rwanda. They contend the UK’s main constraints are not just funding but weak political leadership, low-trust rollout choices (especially around digital ID framing), rigid Treasury/procurement models, and limited iterative delivery capacity. The strategic implication is to pursue small, high-value pilots that build trust, then scale through clear political ownership, procurement reform, open standards, and multi-stakeholder governance to balance sovereignty, resilience, and innovation.
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172.Defending NATO’s eastern flank: How Romania is responding to Russian aggression and European rearmament (Chatham House)
The event argues that Romania has become a pivotal frontline state in defending NATO’s eastern flank as Russia’s war against Ukraine reshapes European security. It points to Romania’s exposure to nearby Russian drone incidents, intensified information warfare, and Black Sea military operations, alongside NATO’s decision to host its largest base on Romanian territory, as evidence of its strategic centrality. Romania’s foreign minister frames continued support for Ukraine, defense modernization, and sustained military investment as core to deterrence and alliance resilience. The policy implication is that European rearmament must accelerate and remain coordinated, especially if US engagement in Europe becomes less reliable, to credibly deter further Russian coercion.
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173.
Vinh Nguyen, a Senior Fellow at CFR and former NSA official, discusses his career trajectory and the evolving challenges of balancing national security with privacy and accountability in the age of artificial intelligence. He argues that while the U.S. must accelerate AI adoption to remain competitive with adversaries like China, it must do so within a democratic framework that preserves legal and ethical standards. Nguyen highlights the urgency of securing AI at its foundational level, noting that technological advancement is currently outpacing security measures and that the government's influence over private-sector tech decisions remains limited. He concludes that both policy frameworks and individual career strategies must rapidly adapt to AI-driven shifts in workflows to maintain a strategic advantage.
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174.
The report argues that the U.S. must transition from a purely protectionist response to China's automotive dominance toward a proactive strategy of global competition in autonomous, connected, and electric (ACE) vehicles. While current tariffs provide temporary breathing room, the author warns that indefinite isolation risks leaving the U.S. as a technological island of obsolete internal combustion engines while ceding international markets to Chinese firms. To maintain competitiveness, the U.S. should provide conditional financial support to domestic manufacturers, coordinate supply-chain diversification with allies, and manage national security risks through data localization rather than total exclusion. This strategy aims to secure the economic and environmental benefits of the automotive revolution while navigating the geopolitical rivalry with China.
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175.
Chatham House argues that accountability mechanisms must rapidly adapt because cyber operations are now being used to facilitate core international crimes, not just conventional cybercrime. The event highlights the International Criminal Court prosecutor’s new policy on cyber-enabled crimes under the Rome Statute as a key signal that cyber-enabled atrocities should be investigated and prosecuted on equal footing with offline conduct. Its reasoning centers on clarifying which cyber acts meet international criminal law thresholds, building workable legal frameworks, and addressing practical barriers to attribution, evidence collection, and prosecution. Strategically, states and international institutions should align domestic and international legal tools, strengthen investigative cooperation, and prioritize capacity for cyber-forensics and cross-border accountability.
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176.
The article argues that the traditional model of data center development—characterized by short-term construction jobs and high resource consumption—must be replaced by a 'mutualistic' approach that leverages AI infrastructure for long-term regional prosperity. It highlights that the current AI scale-up has granted local governments new leverage to negotiate for high-value benefits, such as university R&D partnerships, compute access, and shared equity endowments, rather than settling for modest tax revenues. Policymakers are encouraged to move beyond 'race-to-the-bottom' incentive competitions and instead integrate data centers into broader tech ecosystems that drive energy innovation and local talent development. Ultimately, the report suggests that transforming isolated data centers into community-supported AI hubs is necessary to ensure the industry's growth delivers on its promise of widespread economic reindustrialization.
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177.
Chatham House argues that Bangladesh’s 12 February 2026 election is a pivotal test of democratic transition after the 2024 ouster of Sheikh Hasina, but it is unfolding in a volatile, reconfigured political arena. The report’s reasoning centers on the ban of the Awami League, BNP’s leadership shift under Tarique Rahman, and the unexpected 11-party Jamaat–NCP alliance, alongside polling that shows a tight BNP–Jamaat contest and a decisive youth electorate. It also highlights mounting instability, including killings of activists, intra-opposition tensions, and a major information-war environment marked by bots, deepfakes, decontextualized religious clips, and cross-border disinformation allegations. The policy implication is that domestic and international actors should prioritize election security, violence prevention, and information-integrity measures while supporting inclusive political competition so institutional legitimacy can survive the transition.
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178.
The 'frozen conflict' in Transnistria has reached a critical turning point as Russia's loss of energy leverage and Moldova's EU trajectory create a unique three-year window for full reintegration. Since the cessation of Russian gas transit through Ukraine in early 2025, Transnistria’s subsidized economy has faced collapse, shifting the balance of power toward Chisinau and exposing the fragility of Russian patronage. Successful reintegration will require Moldova to implement a comprehensive roadmap for security vetting and legal harmonization, supported by international diplomatic pressure for Russian troop withdrawal and EU financial aid to manage the transition to market-rate energy.
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179.
This collection of essays argues that the United States and China must coordinate to mitigate the 'malicious uplift' of non-state actors using advanced AI for cyberattacks, biological weapons, and disinformation. The authors highlight that AI's low cost and high accessibility create systemic risks that traditional arms control cannot easily manage, necessitating shared safety guidelines and crisis communication channels. Ultimately, bilateral cooperation is viewed as a necessary catalyst for a global multilateral non-proliferation framework to prevent 'safety arbitrage' by malicious groups.
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180.
The panel’s core finding is that the UK can afford warfighting only if it makes earlier, harder political choices on defence spending and reform, because current plans are too slow for the threat timeline. Speakers argued that moving from roughly 2.3% to 3.5% of GDP requires major trade-offs (higher taxes, cuts elsewhere, or more borrowing) and that past procurement failures have weakened confidence that spending converts into usable capability. They stressed that modern conflict would hit the UK homeland through cyber, disinformation, and infrastructure disruption as well as missiles and drones, while reduced US support raises the burden on Europe. Strategically, the UK should accelerate readiness, improve procurement accountability and industrial surge capacity, rebuild stockpiles, and run a more honest national debate on resilience, mobilisation, and societal preparedness.
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181.
The Abraham Accords have successfully formalized significant bilateral relations, allowing Israel and Gulf states to deepen cooperation in advanced technology, defense, and trade. While these agreements have allowed the Gulf monarchies to improve their international standing and secure economic benefits, the accords are not a comprehensive path to regional peace. The primary limitation remains the failure to address the core Palestinian question, which severely constrains the accords' potential for broader political stability. Policymakers should view the accords as valuable tools for targeted economic and security cooperation rather than a solution to the fundamental regional conflict.
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182.Manpower Analysis to Improve the Functional Alignment and Organizational Structure of Space Training and Readiness Command Headquarters (RAND)
A RAND analysis finds that the U.S. Space Force’s STARCOM headquarters is significantly understaffed, requiring nearly double its current personnel to effectively manage its workload and mission priorities. The study identifies core organizational friction stemming from a lack of unity of effort, structural tensions between lean design and command needs, and resource strain caused by simultaneous start-up and steady-state functions. Researchers recommend implementing a new staffing optimization model (STAR-SOM) and realigning leadership under senior authorities to better synchronize guardian development and combat credibility missions. These findings imply that STARCOM must pursue both a quantitative manpower increase and a qualitative structural reorganization to maintain readiness for near-peer space competition.
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183.
This report describes eight frontier large language model (LLM) agents on their ability to design DNA segments, interact with a benchtop DNA synthesizer, and generate laboratory protocols. These are dual-use tasks, explored as potential technical bottlenecks to a malicious actor building a viral pathogen that could be weaponized. Performance varied among the models, but all tested LLMs designed biologically coherent DNA segments in some attempts.
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184.
The article argues that the U.S. must adopt a 'total defense' posture to prepare for an era of total conflict, emphasizing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. Evidence points to Chinese state-backed groups, such as Volt Typhoon, compromising municipal systems (e.g., water utilities) not for data theft, but to gain strategic leverage. This capability allows adversaries to sow domestic chaos and undermine U.S. resolve during a future conflict. Policy implications mandate a proactive shift toward securing essential infrastructure against sophisticated, state-sponsored cyber threats to maintain national resilience and deter foreign aggression.