ThinkTankWeekly

The Fault Lines in China’s Power

Foreign Affairs | 2026-06-12 | economy

Topics: China, Cybersecurity, Indo-Pacific, Middle East, Nuclear, Russia, Taiwan, Trade, Ukraine, United States

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English Summary

The U.S. failed to exploit China's vulnerabilities during a 2025 trade war, revealing a fundamental gap in Washington's strategy—the absence of competitive leverage over Beijing. When China weaponized rare-earth elements in April 2025, the Trump administration quickly backed down, demonstrating Beijing's effective use of coercive economic pressure while the U.S. pursued only defensive measures. The article catalogs China's internal weaknesses (economic fragility, demographic decline, export dependence) and external dependencies (energy chokepoints through the Malacca Strait, commodity reliance, dollar-based financial system dependence) that the U.S. could systematically exploit. Rather than focusing solely on defensive supply chain resilience, the U.S. must adopt an offensive competitive strategy: tightening semiconductor technology controls with allied partners, coordinating trade restrictions on Chinese export sectors, preparing financial and energy sanctions for crisis scenarios, and exposing China's covert influence operations. This sequenced, calibrated pressure across economics, technology, and information domains would create real deterrent value and constrain Beijing's ability to coerce the U.S. and its partners.

中文摘要

美國在2025年的貿易戰中未能充分利用中國的弱點,暴露了華盛頓戰略上的根本性缺陷——缺乏對北京的競爭性槓桿。當中國於2025年4月將稀土元素武器化時,川普政府迅速退讓,這證明了北京有效利用了強制性經濟壓力,而美國僅採取了防禦性措施。本文列舉了中國的內部弱點(經濟脆弱性、人口結構衰退、出口依賴)和外部依賴(通過馬六甲海峽的能源瓶頸、商品依賴、美元體系金融依賴),這些都是美國可以系統性利用的目標。美國不應僅專注於防禦性的供應鏈韌性,而必須採取更具攻擊性的競爭戰略:與盟友夥伴收緊半導體技術管制、協調對中國出口產業的貿易限制、為危機情景準備金融和能源制裁,並揭露中國的秘密影響行動。這種跨越經濟、技術和資訊領域的、有節奏、可校準的壓力,將能創造真正的威懾價值,從而限制北京對美國及其夥伴實施的強制能力。

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