ThinkTankWeekly

The Eus Burgeoning Defence Role And Its Impact On Third Country Market Access

IISS | 2026-02-22 | diplomacy

Topics: Europe, NATO

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English Summary

IISS argues that the EU is becoming a much stronger regulator and financier of Europe’s defence market, even though NATO remains the main provider of military security. It points to a sharp rise in EU-level defence funding and instruments—from virtually no dedicated budget before 2014 to major 2021–27 allocations, a proposed 2028–34 expansion, and the €150bn SAFE mechanism adopted in 2025—along with stricter rules limiting non-EU participation. The paper also notes a countervailing trend: rapidly growing national defence budgets across Europe are likely to exceed EU funds, allowing member states to bypass some Commission frameworks. Strategically, third countries should expect reduced access in EU-governed segments but may still compete in nationally controlled procurement, while closer partners could secure selective, transactional access by aligning with EU industrial and political priorities.

中文摘要

IISS 主張,儘管 NATO 仍是軍事安全的主要提供者,歐盟正成為歐洲防務市場中更強勢的監管者與資金提供者。該文指出,歐盟層級的防務資金與工具大幅增加:2014 年前幾乎沒有專門預算,至 2021–2027 年已出現大規模配置,並提出 2028–2034 年進一步擴張,以及於 2025 年通過 1,500 億歐元的 SAFE 機制;同時,限制非歐盟參與的規則也趨於嚴格。論文亦提及一股制衡趨勢:歐洲各國防務預算快速成長,可能超過歐盟資金規模,使成員國得以繞過部分歐盟執委會框架。從戰略角度看,第三國應預期在由歐盟治理的領域中准入將降低,但在由各國主導的採購中仍可競爭;而較緊密的夥伴若能配合歐盟的產業與政治優先事項,則可能取得有選擇性、交易導向的准入。

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