The article argues that Donald Trump's unique and prolonged lame-duck period, coupled with domestic political pressures, makes him dangerously prone to international instability. Having exhausted major diplomatic gambits, Trump is expected to channel his energy into high-stakes, unilateral actions, primarily targeting adversaries such as Iran and Cuba. These potential actions—ranging from fresh strikes in the Persian Gulf to attempts at regime change—carry a significant risk of destabilizing regional security and triggering a global economic crisis. Policymakers must anticipate this pivot to high-risk foreign policy to mitigate potential international flare-ups.
Estimating the current and future size of the UK bereaved Armed Forces community
English Summary
This RAND report provides the first comprehensive estimate of the UK Armed Forces bereaved community—over 100,000 people annually as of 2025—including partners, children, and service personnel/veterans who have lost family members. Using Ministry of Defence mortality data and Bayesian forecasting methods, the study estimates that partners bereaved of veterans comprise the largest group (53,100 annually), while the overall bereaved population will decline by 2045 due to aging demographics. The research highlights critical data gaps and emphasizes that a major conflict would substantially increase bereaved family members in younger age groups, fundamentally altering support needs. Support providers must prepare for demographic shifts and recognize the bereaved as a vital but historically overlooked part of the Armed Forces community requiring targeted long-term services.
中文摘要
本蘭德公司報告提供了英國武裝部隊喪親社群的首份全面估計—截至2025年每年超過10萬人—包括伴侶、子女以及失去家庭成員的軍職人員和退役軍人。該研究利用國防部死亡率數據和貝氏預測方法，估計失去伴侶的退役軍人家屬構成最大群體（每年53,100人），而整體喪親人口將因人口老齡化在2045年前下降。研究強調了關鍵的數據缺口，並指出重大衝突將大幅增加年輕年齡組的喪親家庭成員，從根本上改變對支援服務的需求。支援服務提供者必須為人口結構轉變做準備，並認可喪親者是武裝部隊社群中不可或缺但歷來被忽視的一部分，需要提供有針對性的長期服務。
Related Entries
-
1.
-
2.
China's economic strategy is characterized by a persistent 'economics of denial,' prioritizing massive state-directed investment in advanced technology over addressing weak domestic consumption. This approach is rooted in a flawed belief that controlling physical capital will automatically generate productivity and wage growth, ignoring the structural imbalance where domestic demand consistently falls short of supply. This overinvestment and underconsumption model is unsustainable. Consequently, Beijing's policies will continue to generate global deflationary pressures and escalating trade friction, necessitating a fundamental pivot toward consumption-led growth for long-term stability.
-
3.
The U.S. is drastically reducing core funding to multilateral institutions, withdrawing from numerous bodies due to perceived misalignment with national interests. While multilateral channels offer critical advantages—such as pooling resources for global public goods and managing risk in fragile settings—the U.S.'s funding remains heavily 'earmarked,' which effectively 'bilateralizes' the system and undermines shared burden-sharing. This practice, coupled with deep cuts, diminishes the multilateral system's effectiveness and efficiency, particularly in humanitarian aid. Policy recommendations suggest the U.S. must adopt a systematic, published strategy for aid channel choice and shift from restrictive project-level earmarking to broader thematic funding to restore global cooperation.
-
4.
The article analyzes the deep ideological split within the Democratic Party regarding the future of U.S. foreign policy, pitting centrists against progressives. Centrists generally advocate for restoring a reformed U.S.-led international order and strengthening alliances, while progressives argue for a multipolar world that prioritizes transnational threats like climate change and AI over geopolitical competition. This division is most pronounced in the Middle East, where centrists push for greater pressure on Israel and a regional settlement, a shift largely welcomed by progressives. The core finding is that these internal debates threaten to consume a future administration with indecision, making it difficult for the U.S. to project a coherent and unified global strategy.
-
5.
The Brookings report argues that the U.S.'s historical 'exorbitant privilege'—its ability to issue debt cheaply—is steadily eroding. Key evidence shows a decline in the U.S. convenience yield relative to G10 peers, a trend linked to rising domestic debt and global fiscal stress. While recent global interest rate hikes have temporarily improved the U.S.'s relative borrowing appeal, the underlying loss of cheap credit suggests potential future higher borrowing costs for the government and poses long-term risks to the dollar's status as a reserve currency.