The article argues that recent executive overreach and politicization have severely undermined established norms of U.S. civil-military relations. To restore professional standards, the incoming Congress must actively exercise its oversight powers, moving beyond mere criticism to demanding transparency in defense policy and personnel decisions. Key reforms include enforcing meritocratic promotion processes, requiring documented justification for senior officer removals, and preventing the partisan use of the military. These actions are crucial for bolstering public trust and ensuring the military remains a nonpartisan instrument of civilian control.
The Safe Regulation And Its Implications For Non EU Defence Suppliers
English Summary
IISS argues that the EU’s SAFE instrument, while framed as opening some space for third-country participation, will in practice constrain non-EU defence suppliers more than many expect. The paper points to strict eligibility rules—especially the 35% non-EU component cap, EU-centered design-authority requirements, and tight 2030 delivery timelines—as major barriers, with full design-authority transfer seen as particularly unrealistic for many partners. It also cites uneven and politically difficult “enhanced terms” negotiations (e.g., late Canada agreement, UK obstacles, and no invitations for South Korea and Turkiye) as evidence that access is limited in practice. Strategically, these constraints could reduce EU access to allied technologies, weaken interoperability and joint development partnerships, and slow capability innovation in EU-funded procurement.
中文摘要
IISS 認為，歐盟的 SAFE 工具雖被表述為為第三國參與開啟一定空間，但在實務上對非歐盟防務供應商的限制將比多數人預期更大。該文指出，嚴格的資格規則，尤其是非歐盟零組件 35% 上限、以歐盟為中心的設計主導權要求，以及緊迫的 2030 年交付時程，構成主要障礙；而對許多合作夥伴而言，完整移轉設計主導權尤其不切實際。文中亦援引「強化條款」談判進展不均且在政治上困難（例如加拿大協議延後、英國面臨障礙，以及韓國與土耳其未獲邀）作為實務上准入受限的證據。從戰略層面看，這些限制可能降低歐盟取得盟友技術的能力，削弱互操作性與聯合研發夥伴關係，並拖慢歐盟資助採購中的能力創新。
Related Entries
-
1.
-
2.
China's economic strategy is characterized by a persistent 'economics of denial,' prioritizing massive state-directed investment in advanced technology over addressing weak domestic consumption. This approach is rooted in a flawed belief that controlling physical capital will automatically generate productivity and wage growth, ignoring the structural imbalance where domestic demand consistently falls short of supply. This overinvestment and underconsumption model is unsustainable. Consequently, Beijing's policies will continue to generate global deflationary pressures and escalating trade friction, necessitating a fundamental pivot toward consumption-led growth for long-term stability.
-
3.
The Blue Wave signals significant voter frustration with cost of living and inflation, giving Congress a mandate to prioritize affordability and cost-reduction measures. Economically, the rapid build-out of AI data centers is creating localized stress, driving up skilled labor wages and straining resources, while also facing constraints from power grids and potential local regulatory backlash. Policymakers must manage this 'sequencing issue'—addressing rising costs before full productivity gains from AI can materialize—and anticipate shifts in global data center infrastructure as the market matures.
-
4.
The U.S. is drastically reducing core funding to multilateral institutions, withdrawing from numerous bodies due to perceived misalignment with national interests. While multilateral channels offer critical advantages—such as pooling resources for global public goods and managing risk in fragile settings—the U.S.'s funding remains heavily 'earmarked,' which effectively 'bilateralizes' the system and undermines shared burden-sharing. This practice, coupled with deep cuts, diminishes the multilateral system's effectiveness and efficiency, particularly in humanitarian aid. Policy recommendations suggest the U.S. must adopt a systematic, published strategy for aid channel choice and shift from restrictive project-level earmarking to broader thematic funding to restore global cooperation.
-
5.
The article analyzes the deep ideological split within the Democratic Party regarding the future of U.S. foreign policy, pitting centrists against progressives. Centrists generally advocate for restoring a reformed U.S.-led international order and strengthening alliances, while progressives argue for a multipolar world that prioritizes transnational threats like climate change and AI over geopolitical competition. This division is most pronounced in the Middle East, where centrists push for greater pressure on Israel and a regional settlement, a shift largely welcomed by progressives. The core finding is that these internal debates threaten to consume a future administration with indecision, making it difficult for the U.S. to project a coherent and unified global strategy.