Syria is actively positioning itself as a critical regional transit hub, capitalizing on global shifts—such as disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz—by reopening major infrastructure corridors. Key evidence includes the resumption of Iraqi oil flow through Syria and renewed investment from Gulf states and Turkey into projects like the Hejaz Railway and pipelines. While this influx of capital promises to drive reconstruction, the process is fraught with risk: intense competition among regional powers could destabilize the country's fragile recovery. Furthermore, persistent geopolitical friction, particularly from Israel, threatens to undermine Syria’s emergence as a reliable trade gateway, potentially leading to renewed conflict.
How to Fight an Economic War
English Summary
The article argues that the era of mutual benefit through globalization is ending, giving way to intensifying economic warfare. Great powers are increasingly weaponizing economic tools—including tariffs, financial infrastructure, and supply chains—to exert coercion and leverage against rivals. This shift means that economic integration can no longer be viewed as purely beneficial, but rather as a source of potential subordination. Policymakers must therefore develop new strategies to navigate and counter these geopolitical economic threats.
中文摘要
本文論述，透過全球化實現互利共贏的時代正在終結，取而代之的是經濟戰的加劇。大國正日益將經濟工具——包括關稅、金融基礎設施和供應鏈——武器化，以對競爭對手施加強制性壓力與槓桿。這一轉變意味著，經濟整合已不能再被視為純粹有益，反而可能成為潛在的從屬地位來源。因此，政策制定者必須制定新的策略，以應對和抵禦這些地緣經濟威脅。
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