The China-Russia partnership is a highly consequential geopolitical alignment driven by a shared goal of countering U.S. hegemony and reshaping the international order into a multipolar system. While not a formal alliance, this relationship is strengthened by Russia's increasing economic reliance on China following Western sanctions, which allows Beijing to leverage its influence. Policymakers should note that while the partnership projects deep solidarity (as seen in high-level summits), it remains complex and limited by mutual mistrust and competing strategic interests. This enduring alignment poses a significant challenge to U.S. interests and requires continued diplomatic vigilance.
China’s Carriers Increasingly Venture Beyond the First Island Chain
English Summary
China's People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is rapidly advancing its 'blue-water' capabilities, marked by a significant increase in aircraft carrier operations beyond the first island chain. In 2025, the Liaoning and Shandong carriers spent a record 58 days in the Western Pacific, conducting approximately 1,680 sorties and their first simultaneous deployment in the region. This trend signals a strategic shift toward sustained power projection far from Chinese shores, directly challenging established maritime security dynamics. Consequently, regional and global actors must reassess their naval strategies to account for the PLAN's growing reach and operational complexity.
中文摘要
中國人民解放軍海軍（PLAN）正迅速提升其「遠洋」（藍水）能力，其顯著標誌是航空母艦在第一島鏈外的行動大幅增加。2025年，遼寧號與山東號航艦在西太平洋執行任務的時間長達58天，創下歷史紀錄，期間進行了約1,680架次的艦載機起降，並在該區域首度完成雙航艦同時部署。此一趨勢預示著其戰略正轉向遠離中國海岸的持續武力投送，直接挑戰既有的海事安全格局。因此，區域及全球各方必須重新評估其海軍戰略，以因應解放軍海軍不斷擴張的影響力與作戰複雜性。
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