ThinkTankWeekly

Can Iraq’s new prime minister finally rein in its armed factions?

Chatham House | 2026-06-12 | middle_east

Topics: Middle East, Nuclear, Trade

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English Summary

Iraq's new Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi faces the enduring challenge of integrating the Popular Mobilization Forces into state control, made more urgent as Iran-aligned militias draw Iraq into the US-Israeli conflict with Tehran. While some faction leaders—including Muqtada al-Sadr and Qais al-Khazali—have signaled willingness to integrate, groups more deeply tied to Iran's 'axis of resistance' such as Kataeb Hezbollah refuse, exposing the limits of any consolidation effort. Past integration attempts, like the Badr Corps after 2003, show that formal incorporation into state institutions does not sever informal loyalties or transfer real coercive power, particularly control over drones and rockets, to Baghdad. The war may offer a political opening as some PMF leaders prioritize the economic gains of stability over resistance, but entrenched patronage networks and US pressure for faster action complicate the path forward.

中文摘要

伊拉克新任總理乍伊迪(Ali al-Zaidi)面臨將「人民動員部隊」(PMF)納入國家管控的長期挑戰,而隨著親伊朗民兵將伊拉克捲入美國與以色列對德黑蘭的衝突,此一課題更顯迫切。部分派系領袖——包括薩德爾(Muqtada al-Sadr)與哈扎利(Qais al-Khazali)——已表達整合意願,但與伊朗「抵抗軸心」關係更深的團體如真主黨旅(Kataeb Hezbollah)則拒絕配合,暴露出整合努力的局限。過往的整合經驗,如2003年後巴德爾軍團的納編,顯示正式併入國家機構並不能切斷非正式的效忠關係,也無法將真正的強制力量——特別是無人機與火箭的控制權——移交給巴格達。戰爭或許為部分人民動員部隊領導人提供了政治契機,使其優先考量穩定所帶來的經濟利益而非抵抗路線,但根深蒂固的庇護網絡與美國要求加速行動的壓力,使前路更加複雜。

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