The China-Russia partnership is a highly consequential geopolitical alignment driven by a shared goal of countering U.S. hegemony and reshaping the international order into a multipolar system. While not a formal alliance, this relationship is strengthened by Russia's increasing economic reliance on China following Western sanctions, which allows Beijing to leverage its influence. Policymakers should note that while the partnership projects deep solidarity (as seen in high-level summits), it remains complex and limited by mutual mistrust and competing strategic interests. This enduring alignment poses a significant challenge to U.S. interests and requires continued diplomatic vigilance.
Holding state-sponsored hackers and other cyber proxies to account
English Summary
Russia employs 'cyber proxies'—criminal groups, hacktivists, and private entities with varying degrees of state direction—to conduct disruptive cyberattacks against Ukraine while maintaining plausible deniability and complicating attribution. This proxy model shields the Russian state from sanctions while making coordinated response difficult. Chatham House proposes a strategic approach integrating international and domestic law with cost-imposition and disruption tactics to establish deterrence against cyber proxies of any origin, replacing ad-hoc tactical responses with comprehensive, enabling policies.
中文摘要
俄羅斯運用「網路代理」——包括犯罪組織、駭客行動主義者及受不同程度國家控制的私人實體——對烏克蘭發動擾亂性網路攻擊，同時維持合理否認並複雜化歸屬認定。此代理模式既保護俄羅斯國家免受制裁，又使協調應對複雜化。英國皇家國際事務研究所主張採取戰略性方針，將國際與國內法律結合成本施加與破壞戰術，對任何來源的網路代理建立威懾，以全面且可執行的政策取代臨時性戰術回應。
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