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Rare earths are on Trump’s agenda in China. But US electronic waste offers an untapped source at home

Chatham House | 2026-05-18 | economy

Topics: China, Indo-Pacific, Trade, Economy

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English Summary

While China maintains critical dominance over the global rare earth processing supply chain, the US possesses a substantial, untapped domestic resource: electronic waste (e-waste). Estimates suggest that annual US e-waste contains enough rare earth magnets to meet a significant portion of projected domestic demand, far exceeding current domestic mining capacity. However, this potential is hampered by a lack of uniform federal recycling laws and specialized collection infrastructure, leading to valuable materials leaking out of the economy. To achieve mineral security, the US must shift its strategy from solely developing new mines to establishing a robust circular economy model. This requires federal policy intervention, investment in advanced separation technologies, and incentivizing product design for easy disassembly.

中文摘要

儘管中國在全球稀土加工供應鏈中保持關鍵主導地位,美國卻擁有一個可觀的、尚未開發的國內資源:電子廢棄物(e-waste)。估計顯示,美國每年的電子廢棄物含有足夠的稀土磁鐵,足以滿足相當比例的國內預期需求,其數量遠超目前的國內採礦能力。然而,這種潛力受到缺乏統一聯邦回收法規和專業收集基礎設施的限制,導致寶貴材料從經濟體系中流失。為實現礦產安全,美國必須將其戰略重點從單純開發新礦轉移到建立穩健的循環經濟模式。這需要聯邦政策介入、投資先進的分離技術,並激勵產品設計以利於拆解。

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